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LOCALIZING THE GREEN ENERGY REVOLUTION
Hannah J. Wiseman *
ABSTRACT
The United States is on the verge of a new industrial revolution. Renewable
energy could replace more than 60% of our current energy generation
infrastructure in fifteen years. This change is critical, yet it risks failure. The
renewable generation already built in the United States consists primarily of
large-scale projects connected to transmission lines in rural areas. The
expansive new generation needed to reduce carbon emissions must also be
predominantly large-scale, and rural, for reasons of efficiency. But a revolution
that focuses nearly exclusively on “big energy” is likely to encounter obstacles,
and it has downsides that could be mitigated with a stronger focus on smallscale energy.
Many rural Americans—predominantly Republican—oppose Democratic
policies, particularly climate policies. Even avowedly green liberal communities
have mounted stiff opposition to renewable energy in some areas. Many
landowners—particularly farmers—welcome the income from renewable
energy leases, but residents often object to the blinking lights, landscape
disruption, unsightly wires, and other impacts of these projects. Beyond facing
political opposition, a projected buildout of more than 200,000 miles of new
transmission lines to support new large-scale renewable projects threatens to
create negative infrastructural path dependence. This could be analogous to the
federal highway network expansion of the 1950s, which largely cemented U.S.
reliance on cars rather than mass transit and divided communities. We need a
nationwide network of new long-distance transmission lines to connect large
renewable energy generation to population centers. But small energy projects
could replace the need for some of these wires.
Policymakers should place greater emphasis on “small” distributed energy
in the form of solar and wind generation over or near parking lots, roadways,
and buildings; community-scale renewables and microgrids; and energy
efficiency projects, such as weatherization of apartment buildings. This effort is
likely to be more politically feasible than a revolution focused too heavily on
*
Professor of Law; Professor and Wilson Faculty Fellow in the College of Earth and Mineral Sciences;
Institutes of Energy and the Environment Co-funded Faculty, Penn State—University Park. J.D., Yale Law
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large-scale projects. And when targeted properly, small-scale clean energy can
reduce the crushing energy burdens faced by low-income communities, whether
rural or urban.
For the energy transition to be feasible and less objectionable from a
community and present-day environmental perspective, energy policies should
also ensure that large-scale renewable generation is built in ways that reduce
host community impacts. Renewable or clean energy policies should prioritize
projects on polluted or abandoned brownfields, as New York requires; on
marginalized farmlands; or offshore. Policies should also require large-scale
renewable energy developers to negotiate with host communities and offer
benefits—another strategy followed in New York.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is on the verge of another industrial revolution. In the first
decade of the twenty-first century, domestic fossil fuel development expanded
rapidly due to hydraulic fracturing and new drilling techniques. 1 Just over a
decade later, the federal government and states are rolling out plans for a
nationwide “green” energy revolution involving the development of massive
renewable energy infrastructure and associated transmission lines. 2 President
Biden has set an aggressive goal of achieving 100% carbon-free power by 2035
in the United States, a move that would require replacement of more than 60%
of U.S. power generation in just under 15 years. 3 He has also directed federal
agencies to investigate the expansion of federal authority over the siting of new
transmission lines. 4 200,000 or even 400,000 miles of new transmission lines
1
These shock waves were both positive and negative. Many residents objected to noise, spills, air
pollution, and other impacts. But many local officials welcomed the beneficial local economic effects that
fracking had in many places. See Richard Newell & Daniel Raimi, Shale Public Finance: Local Government
Revenues and Costs Associated with Oil and Gas Development (Natl. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 21542, Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21542/w21542.pdf?utm_
campaign=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&amp%3Butm_medium=PANTHEON_STRIPPED&amp%3Butm_sour
ce=PANTHEON_STRIPPED (observing that “increas[ing] revenues . . . have generally outweighed” costs
arising from new service demands for local governments experiencing oil and gas development as part of the
hydraulic fracturing boom, but noting “net negative fiscal effects” for “most local governments in North Dakota
and Montana’s Bakken region” and similar struggles for local governments in “very rural parts of Colorado and
Wyoming”).
2
See infra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
3
See The Biden Plan to Build a Modern, Sustainable Infrastructure and an Equitable Clean Energy
Future, JOEBIDEN.COM, https://joebiden.com/clean-energy/ (declaring the goal of 100% carbon-free power by
2035); Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s): What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Source?, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (showing that carbon-free nuclear and
renewable energy sources currently make up approximately 38% of the U.S. energy generation mix). Although
this goal is aggressive as measured against past U.S. climate action (namely, inaction), it might not be aggressive
enough from the standpoint of avoiding potentially catastrophic climate change. As the International Energy
Agency emphasizes, even with a growing number of pledges to achieve net-zero carbon emissions from
countries around the world, 22 billion tons of carbon would still be released into the atmosphere in 2050, causing
an estimated temperature increase of 2.1 degrees Celsius by 2100. The consensus among climate scientists is
that negative carbon emissions will likely be necessary to avoid potentially catastrophic climate effects.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 C at 114, https://www.ipcc.ch/
site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_Low_Res.pdf.
4
See Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,619 (Jan. 27, 2021) (directing some agency heads to
“identify steps that can be taken, consistent with applicable law, to accelerate the deployment of clean energy
and transmission projects in an environmentally stable manner”); see also H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. § 2(C)(i)
(2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hres109/BILLS-116hres109ih.pdf (as part of the proposed Green
New Deal, proposing a mandate of 100% clean energy within 10 years by “dramatically expanding and
upgrading renewable power sources,” among other measures); Clean Energy Act of 2019, S. 1359, 116th Cong.
§ 610(c)(2)(C) (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1359/text (proposing a bill that
would require large utilities, which rely almost wholly on large scale generation, to provide 90% clean energy
annually by 2040).
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could be required to support a carbon-free U.S. power generation sector. 5 States
and local governments, too, are moving forward with their own zero- and lowcarbon energy policies, many of which aim to rapidly increase the number of
large-scale renewable energy and transmission projects. 6
This frenzied transition will largely replace fossil fuels with low-carbon,
low-pollution energy, and it is essential if we wish to mitigate the widespread,
increasingly catastrophic impacts of climate change—more wildfires, flooding,
saltwater intrusion, temperature extremes, and deadly storms, for example. 7
Large-scale renewables will likely have to be the dominant strategy to a zerocarbon future. 8 This is because serious efforts to decarbonize require
electrification of major energy consuming activities such as transportation,
heating of buildings, and cooking, thus substantially increasing electricity
5
See Dan Shreve & Wade Schauer, Deep Decarbonisation Requires Deep Pockets: Trillions Required
to Make the Transition, WOOD MACKENZIE, http://www.decarbonisation.think.woodmac.com/section1/
(“Assuming 200,000 miles of new HVT at an average price of US$3.5 million/mile adds US$700 billion.”);
ERIC LARSON, ET AL., PRINCETON UNIV., NET-ZERO AMERICA: POTENTIAL PATHWAYS, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND
IMPACTS, INTERIM REPORT 106 (2020), https://environmenthalfcentury.princeton.edu/sites/g/files/toruqf331/
files/2020-12/Princeton_NZA_Interim_Report_15_Dec_2020_FINAL.pdf (finding that transmission capacity
would have to expand by 60% to reach the 2030 goal of 100% zero-carbon energy and that it would have to
triple to reach the 2050 net-zero carbon goal).
6
See, e.g., S.B. 100, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billVersionsCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB100 (requiring 100% of retail electricity sales to come
from zero-carbon energy source by 2045); S. 7508-B, 2020 Gen. Assemb. § 2 (N.Y. 2020), https://nyassembly.
gov/2020budget/2020budget/A9508b.pdf (consolidating environmental review and permitting renewable
energy projects in New York to achieve the mandate of limiting carbon emissions to 15% of 1990 emissions by
2050); S. 7508-B § 2 (2.b) (“[T]he state shall provide for timely and cost effective construction of new,
expanded, and upgraded distribution and transmission infrastructure as may be needed to access and deliver
renewable energy resources, which may include . . . high voltage direct current transmission[.]”); S.B. 5116,
66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2019-20/Pdf/Bills/Session%
20Laws/Senate/5116-S2.SL.pdf?q=20201029071502 (mandating carbon-free electricity in Washington State by
2045); S.B. 5116 § 14 (1)(f), (h), http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2019-20/Pdf/Bills/Session%20Laws/
Senate/5116-S2.SL.pdf?q=20201029071502 (requiring retail utilities, which primarily rely on centralized
generation, to develop plans for achieving the carbon-free electricity mandate, and requiring those utilities to
assess both centralized generation and transmission and the possibility of distributed projects); H.B. 50, 2020
Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2020), https://legiscan.com/NM/text/HB50/id/2161656/New_Mexico-2020-HB50-Enrolled.
pdf (enabling bonds for transmission line projects to support centralized renewable energy).
7
WORKING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_full.pdf (observing that to keep a global
temperature increase of less than two degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels—which could avoid
potentially catastrophic effects of climate change—requires “substantial cuts in anthropogenic GHG
[greenhouse gas] emissions by mid-century through large-scale changes in energy systems”).
8
See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Legal Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale Renewable
Generation Capacity, 47 ENV’T L. RPTR. 10591, 10591 (2017) (observing that “[d]ecarbonizing the U.S. energy
system will require a program of building onshore wind, offshore wind, utility-scale solar, and associated
transmission that will exceed what has been done before in the United States by many times, every year out to
2050,” and also noting the importance of “rooftop photovoltaics and other distributed generation”).
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demand. 9 And utility-scale renewable energy is far less expensive than
distributed energy, although the magnitude of the price difference is debated. 10
Despite the clear necessity of large renewable energy generation and a major
transmission expansion to support this generation, a revolution focused too
heavily on utility-scale has avoidable downsides. It could create negative
infrastructural path dependence akin to the construction of the federal highway
system in the 1950s. The extensive highway buildout solidified reliance on cars
over public transit and divided communities along racial and income-based
lines. 11 An energy revolution that fails to include all feasible small-scale energy
measures will similarly have greater-than-necessary social and environmental
impacts. 12 Some scholars and policymakers correctly emphasize that the impacts
of climate change on landscapes and species will be far larger than the
immediate, physical impacts of clean power generation and transmission lines.
But this is unlikely to curb many local environmental groups’ and residents’
opposition to large renewable energy installations. 13
9
See, e.g., id. (noting “the added electricity that will be needed as many uses currently employing fossil
fuels (especially passenger transportation and space and water heating) are electrified”); Richard Audoly, Adrien
Vogt-Schilb, Celine Guivarch & Alexander Pfeiffer, Pathways Toward Zero-Carbon Electricity Required for
Climate Stabilization, 225 APPLIED ENERGY 884 (2018) (describing the important role of electrification in the
carbon transition).
10
For estimates that show high costs of distributed solar, see infra note 146. A study of U.S.
decarbonization using both large and small-scale renewables and storage finds $88 billion in savings as
compared to continuing today’s approach to energy. VIBRANT CLEAN ENERGY, COALITION FOR COMMUNITY
SOLAR, VOTE SOLAR & LOCAL SOLAR FOR ALL, WHY LOCAL SOLAR FOR ALL COSTS LESS: A NEW ROADMAP
FOR THE LOWEST COST GRID 20 (2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f4637895cfc8d77860d0dbc/
t/5fd39999439c7c5ec221499b/1607702942515/Local+Solar+Roadmap+White+Paper+as+PPT+FINAL.pdf.
11
See, e.g., Deborah N. Archer, “White Men’s Roads Through Black Men’s Homes”: Advancing Racial
Equity Through Highway Reconstruction, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1275 (2020) (“Robert Moses, an influential
New York public official who shaped urban development and public works projects both in New York and
around the country, was a leader among those who believed infrastructure projects and physical barriers would
be effective, semipermanent barriers to access for poor people of color.”). Archer noted that Moses purposefully
planned for bridges over some highways to be lower to ensure that buses, which Black and Puerto Rican
individuals tended to ride, could not access those highways, which led to parks and beaches. Id.; Alexandra B.
Klass, Future-Proofing Energy Law, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 827, 830 (2017) (noting concerns about “pathdependency” in energy transport decisions, including the construction of transmission lines). For extensive
discussion of how a failure to “foreground” justice issues in the clean energy transition could once again cause
industrial burdens to fall most heavily on low-income communities, including black and brown communities,
see Shalanda H. Baker, Anti-Resilience: A Roadmap for Transformational Justice Within the Energy System, 54
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15–19 (2019).
12
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (PEIS)
FOR SOLAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN SIX SOUTHWESTERN STATES, at ES-23 (2012), https://solareis.anl.gov/
documents/fpeis/Solar_FPEIS_Volume_1.pdf (summarizing impacts of potentially extensive western solar
energy development on wildlife).
13
See generally Jeff Thaler, Fiddling as the World Floods and Burns: How Climate Change Urgently
Requires a Paradigm Shift in the Permitting of Renewable Energy Projects, 42 ENV’T L. 1101 (2012) (arguing
for abbreviated environmental review of renewable energy projects due to the urgency of these projects); David
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A green energy revolution that marginalizes small-scale approaches could
also exacerbate existing political economic tensions and psychological barriers
to climate initiatives. 14 Further, this movement could heighten energy justice
concerns despite concerted efforts to enhance equity in the energy sphere. 15 And
without adequate attention to grid reliability and resiliency, which small-scale
energy can enhance, further grid crises caused by weather extremes could fuel
opposition to large-scale renewables even when renewables are not to blame for
outages. 16
The green energy revolution of the 2020s represents a critical crossroads in
infrastructural decision-making. An extensive buildout of both large- and smallscale zero-carbon energy will be necessary for real progress on the climate
B. Spence, Regulation and the New Politics of (Energy) Market Entry, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 327 (2019)
(identifying local environmental groups’ opposition to wind energy projects through an empirical study);
Renewable Energy Legal Defense Initiative, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., COLUM. L. SCH./COLUM.
UNIV. EARTH INST., https://climate.law.columbia.edu/content/renewable-energy-legal-defense-initiative (last
visited May 21, 2021) (describing projects in which the Renewable Energy Legal Defense Initiative helped
proponents of renewable energy projects overcome opposition).
14
See infra Part I.
15
The Biden administration has expressly focused on addressing energy justice issues, creating a new
Deputy for Environmental Justice within the Department of Energy and planning for a large portion of the $2
trillion investment in clean energy to go to disadvantaged populations. See Department of Energy Announces
New Senior Leaders, DEPT. OF ENERGY (Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.energy.gov/articles/department-energyannounces-new-senior-leaders; Juliet Eilperin, Brady Dennis & Darryl Fears, Biden to Place Environmental
Justice at Center of Sweeping Climate Plan, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2021, 12:51 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/01/26/biden-environmental-justice-climate/. But the siting and
construction of large renewable energy projects and transmission lines in rural communities around the United
States will require a herculean community engagement effort. Reliance on localized, distributed energy placed
first in disadvantaged communities would similarly require extensive engagement. Many communities,
understandably, distrust government-subsidized companies or government employees coming into their homes
and apartment buildings and proposing changes. But making clean energy a more local project could also
empower communities, in contrast with large energy companies coming into communities and industrializing
portions of these communities. See, e.g., Diana Hernández & Stephen Bird, Energy Burden and the Need for
Integrated Low-Income Housing and Energy Policy, 2 POVERTY PUB. POL’Y 5 (2010) (noting community energy
outreach and energy literacy pilot programs that gave residents tools and options for reducing their energy use
and bills); Baker, supra note 11, at 12 (noting how “endogenous” resources such as local solar and wind could
empower low-income Black and brown communities if implemented in transformative ways that avoid
perpetuating existing inequalities in the energy system).
16
Frozen wind turbines were a small part of a much larger problem during Texas’s Polar Vortex incident,
but they received much of the blame. Although the crisis in Texas was not primarily caused by renewable energy,
it exposed the difficulty of relying heavily on any one form of energy to fulfill widespread and variable demand
for energy. In this case, natural gas—which usually serves to fill in the energy demand (“load”) not covered by
wind—failed to deliver, in part due to frozen equipment and electricity outages at gas wells, gas storage areas,
and pipelines. With wind and natural gas generators producing less electricity than usual and demand spiking,
the grid operator was forced to impose short-term blackouts to avoid system failure. See, e.g., Bill Magness,
Review of February 2021 Extreme Cold Weather Event — ERCOT Presentation, at 14 (Feb. 25, 2021),
http://www.ercot.com/content/wcm/lists/226271/Texas_Legislature_Hearings_2-25-2021.pdf (showing natural
gas outages exceeding outages for solar and wind during the Polar Vortex event).
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front. 17 But given the dominance to-date of large-scale measures, this movement
should place more emphasis on three smaller-scale green energy forms: (1) solar
and wind generation over or near parking lots, roadways, and buildings;
(2) community-scale renewable energy projects (mid-sized projects, which
residents subscribe to or collectively own) and microgrids; and (3) energy
efficiency measures such as weatherization and the installation of modern airconditioners. 18 For the many large-scale projects that will also be necessary,
green energy policies should require the least intrusive forms of this
development, such as building on abandoned lots and marginally productive
farmland. 19 And to address the diverse local concerns that arise when developers
build large infrastructure in communities, these policies should require
17
See, e.g., LARSON ET AL., supra note 5, at 4–5 (observing that to hold the global-average surface
temperature increase to two degrees Celsius—a level that would “entail climatic disruption and impacts
considerably greater than those currently being experienced at just half of that increase”—major industrial
nations will have to cut emissions of greenhouse gases by “80 to 100 percent by around 2050”). Rooftop solar
on existing buildings that have the proper roof orientation for solar would cover approximately 40% of current
U.S. electricity use. See PIETER GAGNON, ROBERT MARGOLIS, JENNIFER MELIUS, CALEB PHILLIPS & RYAN
ELMORE, NATL. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. ROOFTOP SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC TECHNICAL POTENTIAL IN THE
UNITED STATES: A DETAILED ASSESSMENT, at vii (2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/65298.pdf. Of
course, many residential and commercial building occupants lack the motivation or funds to install rooftop solar.
But the 40 percent figure ignores the possibility of solar placed along highways and over parking lots.
Photovoltaic solar panels installed on only seven percent of all existing built infrastructure in the United States—
highways, parking lots, and so on—would be needed to cover all existing U.S. demand for electricity. U.S. DEPT.
OF ENERGY, NATL. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., PV FAQS, at 1 (2004), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy04osti/
35097.pdf. Given the efficiencies of large-scale zero-carbon generation and growing electrification, however,
large-scale generation will likely still need to be the predominant electricity source.
18
For definitions of these approaches, see, e.g., Sara Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids,
43 CONN. L. Rev. 547, 559 (2010) (defining distributed generation as “the production of electricity by a smallscale source located at or very near the end users it serves.”); id. at 549-50 (defining microgrids as “small-scale,
low-voltage distributed generation,” which typically power a portion of a neighborhood using “sources such as
solar collectors, wind power systems, microturbines, geothermal wells, and fuel cells”); Hannah J. Wiseman &
Sara C. Bronin, Community-Scale Renewable Energy, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 165, 165–66
(2012-13) (defining community renewables as “mid-sized energy sources supported by resources pooled from
several private parties in close geographic proximity”); HEATHER PAYNE, JONAS MONAST, HANNAH WISEMAN
& NICOLAS EASON, UNC CTR. CLIMATE, ENERGY, ENV’T, AND ECON., TRANSITIONING TO A LOWER-CARBON
ENERGY FUTURE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR MUNICIPAL UTILITIES AND ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES 9
(2017), https://law.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/fsuuncmuni.pdf (describing community solar projects
in Sacramento in which the city builds local projects and allows customers to subscribe to these projects by
purchasing electricity from them); U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, COMMUNITY WIND BENEFITS (2012), https://www.
nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/56386.pdf (describing locally owned community wind projects with applications at
“schools, hospitals, businesses, farms, ranches, or community facilities”).
19
Policy requirements for siting renewables on “marginalized lands” must be undertaken with caution,
however. Lands that are considered marginal under broad-brush metrics developed by policymakers are often
highly valued by individuals and communities. See Jennifer Baka, Do Wastelands Exist? Perspectives on
Productive Land Use in India’s Rural Energyscapes, in RCC PERSPECTIVES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY, ENERGIZING THE SPACES OF EVERYDAY LIFE: LEARNING FROM THE PAST FOR A
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (Vanessa Taylor & Heather Chappells eds., 2019), http://www.environmentandsociety.
org/sites/default/files/2019_i2_web.pdf.
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community-engaged development and payments for impacts, whether through
taxes, payments in lieu of taxes, community benefits agreements, or electricity
rate reductions. 20
A greater emphasis on small-scale energy will reduce the amount of durable
infrastructure needed to support a large transition to renewables, and it could
overcome many existing political economic barriers to clean energy. If targeted
to the right populations—by prioritizing energy efficiency and distributed solar
on multi-family properties, for example—small-scale clean energy measures
would also lower the energy burdens shouldered by millions of the most
disadvantaged Americans, thus addressing rather than exacerbating energy
justice. 21 Many U.S. residents must choose between turning on the heat and
buying medicine or food. 22 Lowering these residents’ energy bills lifts some of
the energy-related monetary obligations that create this unreasonable choice. 23
Small-scale energy also tends to produce more jobs within communities, as
opposed to jobs within national corporate headquarters. 24 And particularly in the

20
Some state energy transition policies already include these requirements, thus providing a helpful
model. New York’s Accelerated Renewable Energy Growth and Community Benefit Act requires host
community benefits, rate reductions, or alternative forms of compensation to residents of host communities. See
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 94-c(f) (McKinney 2020); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1902(6) (McKinney 2020). New
Mexico’s Energy Transition Act requires that developers of “replacement resources” (renewables that replace
coal and other power plants) pay local taxes or payments in lieu of taxes. See S.B. 489 § 3(E) (N.M. 2019).
These payment schemes should be carefully designed and implemented to provide meaningful community
investments, not mere “buy-outs.”
21
See Hernandez & Bird, supra note 15, at 2 (describing “energy burden,” which is “the disproportionate
allocation of financial resources among low-income households on energy expenditures” that often involves
difficult trade-offs such as turning on the heat or buying food for children); ARIEL DREHOBL, LAUREN ROSS &
ROZANA AYALA, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., HOW HIGH ARE HOUSEHOLD ENERGY
BURDENS? (2020), https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/u2006.pdf (showing the highest burdens
among low-income and minority groups).
22
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLD ENERGY BURDEN VARIES AMONG STATES
– EFFICIENCY CAN HELP IN ALL OF THEM 1 (2018), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/01/f58/WIPEnergy-Burden_final.pdf (noting that “[h]igh energy burdens” can “force tough choices between paying energy
bills and buying food, medicine, or other essentials”).
23
Id.
24
See, e.g., HOWARD GELLER, JOHN DECICCO & SKIP LAITNER, ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND JOB CREATION:
THE EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME BENEFITS FROM INVESTING IN ENERGY CONSERVING TECHNOLOGIES, REPORT
NUMBER ED922, at III (1992), https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/ED922.pdf
(concluding that widespread energy efficiency measures produce the highest job gains in the “construction, retail
trade, and services industries”); BW RSCH. PARTNERSHIP, NASEO, & ENERGY FUTURES INITIATIVE, WAGES,
BENEFITS, AND CHANGE; A SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO THE ANNUAL U.S. ENERGY AND EMPLOYMENT REPORT 5
(2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a98cf80ec4eb7c5cd928c61/t/606b8771c7ee880d3110085f/1617
659768456/The+Wage+Report.pdf (noting that “[e]nergy efficiency installation, maintenance, and repair jobs
are unique in that they are ubiquitous across the United States,” with jobs in all 3,000 U.S. counties with the
exception of 6).
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context of energy efficiency, small energy is strongly linked to positive health
outcomes in low-income communities. 25
Getting to “net zero” carbon emissions will require changes well beyond the
electricity sector. It will also necessitate electrification of stoves, heating, and
the vehicle fleet (thus demanding even more renewable energy generation), or
the expansion of renewable fuels such as “green” hydrogen, which is hydrogen
produced from renewable energy. 26 Furthermore, it will require major changes
in the industrial sector, where fossil fuels directly power processes such as
cement, iron, and steel production, and are used as ingredients in some
production processes, such as plastics manufacturing. 27 This Essay focuses
solely on the electricity sector, however, because this sector is at the forefront of
federal and state policy efforts to transition the United States to a lower carbon
society.
Part I of this Essay explores the extent to which the green energy revolution
threatens to repeat the mistakes of past industrial transitions from an
infrastructural, political, economic, and environmental justice perspective and
proposes solutions to these challenges. Part II analyzes the technological and
economic factors that have converged to make this an ideal time for a better,
more localized revolution. Finally, Part III briefly identifies legal hurdles to a
localized energy revolution but concludes that all of these hurdles are
surmountable.
The burgeoning green revolution does not have to follow a predominantly
large-scale industrial path. Rather than intensifying and expanding classic
“locally undesirable land uses,” or LULUs, the transition away from carbon can
and should incent desirable energy development that directly benefits electricity
consumers. 28 Without this approach, the urgent project of combatting potentially
25
See, e.g., Jill Breysee, Sherry Dixon, Joel Gregory, Miriam Philby, David E. Jacobs & James Krieger,
Effect of Weatherization Combined With Community Health Worker In-Home Education on Asthma Control,
104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 57, 63 (2014) (showing that education about asthma triggers coupled with energy
efficiency and other home improvements reduced the percentage of children with not-well-controlled or poorlycontrolled asthma from 100% to 28.8% in the study group, as compared to 100% to 51.6% in the comparison
group).
26
Plug-in electric and hydrogen vehicles will be an essential part of the mix because transportation is the
largest carbon-emitting sector in the United States, but this paper focuses on the electric generation aspects of
the green energy revolution. See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
AND SINKS 1990-2018, at ES-7, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2020-04/documents/us-ghginventory-2020-main-text.pdf (showing transportation as the leading greenhouse gas emitter).
27
See, e.g., Jeffrey Rissman et al., Technologies and Policies to Decarbonise Global Industry: Review
and Assessment of Mitigation Drivers Through 2070, 266 APPLIED ENERGY 1, 6 (2020).
28
See, e.g., Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate
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cataclysmic climate scenarios could face problematic delay and leave important
benefits on the table.
I.

INFRASTRUCTURE, POLITICS, AND JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGES OF LARGESCALE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

Communities in the United States are no stranger to rapid economic and
infrastructural transformations. In the 1950s, the General Motors Corporation,
seeking more and faster roads for the cars that it produced, announced a national
essay competition on the planning and finance of highways. 29 The winner was
Robert Moses, a New York “power broker” who had built New York’s large
parkways along with a massive network of bridges and parks. 30 This awardwinning essay and Robert Moses’s real-life examples from New York, paired
with other authors’ advocacy for a national highway system, strongly influenced
President Eisenhower’s highway expansion. 31 The result was a massive network
of federal highways that provided larger and safer roads but also literally divided
communities along racial lines. 32 The construction of a highway system also
cemented in place a U.S. path dependency on cars. 33
More recent development booms have had similarly powerful effects. The
“fracking revolution,” which reached full force around 2010, transformed
relatively quiet cities and towns in places like North Dakota and Pennsylvania
into boomtowns. 34 As with highways, fracking has important upsides—it has
enhanced the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), poured millions of dollars into
communities, and (in the case of natural gas produced from fracked wells)
allowed a quick transition away from coal-fired power. 35 But oil and gas
Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1384 (1994) (introducing the challenge of “waste dumps,
polluting factories, and other locally undesirable land uses (LULUs)” and their location).
29
See GM’s Better Highways Award, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP. https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/
gmaward.cfm (last visited May 12, 2021).
30
TOM LEWIS, DIVIDED HIGHWAYS 28–29, 37–38 (2013).
31
Norman Bel Geddes successfully advocated for a national highway system, whereas Moses preferred
the more regional (yet still sprawling and grandiose) highways such as those that he built in New York. See id.
at 43–45.
32
Robert Moses purposefully designed bridge heights in New York to prevent buses—which commonly
carried Black and Puerto Rican New Yorkers—from accessing highways that led to public amenities such as
beaches and parks. Archer, supra note 11, at 1275.
33
See ANDRES DUANY, ELIZABETH PLATER-ZYBERK, & JEFF SPECK, SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF
SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000).
34
See Fort Worth City of Fort Worth – Gas Well Status, CITY OF FORT WORTH, https://cfw.maps.arcgis.
com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=8487c19655cd40d08d57f64de3f4339f (last visited May 12, 2021).
35
See, e.g., Daniel Raimi, The Economic Impacts of the Shale Revolution, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE
(2018), https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF-IB-18-03_1.pdf (noting that oil and gas production caused a $294
billion increase in GDP in 2014, although the GDP effects decreased substantially when oil and gas prices
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development has substantial environmental impacts and could create thousands
of abandoned “legacy” wells, which sometimes leak methane. 36 Additionally,
the burst of U.S. oil and gas production activity triggered a widespread
expansion of pipelines, with 41,000 miles of new pipelines to be constructed
within the next 20 years. 37 Although most pipelines are buried, they sometimes
trigger fatal explosions and dangerous spills, and open corridors above the
pipelines remain for maintenance purposes. 38
A true revolution in the growth of renewable power generation will be
similarly expansive. In 2013, when wind power was rapidly expanding in the
Midwest, utilities constructed a record high 4,500 miles of new transmission
lines. 39 Yet in 2013, wind represented only 4.1% of U.S. electricity generation. 40
Policies that aim for 100% wind, solar, and other zero-carbon resources (most
of them large scale) would require a doubling or tripling of the current 200,000
miles of transmission lines in the United States, to the tune of $700 billion. 41
The effects of this revolution, like others, run along a continuum. Large-scale
renewable development has powerful upsides in the form of economic growth
in rural communities. Renewable energy, although displacing some farmland,
can allow some struggling farmers to stay in business due to lease payments
from the energy company. 42 And wind energy, in particular, is compatible with

declined).
36
See, e.g., Abandoned & Orphan Well Program, PA. DEPT. OF ENV’T PROTECTION, https://www.dep.pa.
gov/Business/Energy/OilandGasPrograms/OilandGasMgmt/LegacyWells/Pages/default.aspx (last visited May
12, 2021) (noting that “there are instances in which an oil and gas company files for bankruptcy protection or
moves out of the commonwealth, leaving its wells improperly abandoned”); PA. DEPT. OF ENV’T PROT., 2017
OIL AND GAS ANNUAL REPORT, https://gis.dep.pa.gov/2017oilandgasannualreport/ (estimating that “between
100,000 and 560,000 abandoned oil and gas wells exist in Pennsylvania that remain unaccounted for”).
37
KEVIN PETAK, JULIO MANIK & ANDREW GRIFFITH, NORTH AMERICAN MIDSTREAM INFRASTRUCTURE
THROUGH 2035: SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT CONTINUES 2 (2018), https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=34658.
38
Pipeline Incidents 20 Year Trends, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANS., PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
SAFETY ADMIN. (Feb. 17, 2021), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/data-and-statistics/pipeline/pipeline-incident-20year-trends (follow “Serious Incident 20 Year Trend” hyperlink; then filter System Type field for “Gas
Transmission”) (describing 1,404 significant gas pipeline incidents in the past 20 years).
39
Jeff St. John, Transmission Emerging as Major Stumbling Block for State Renewable Targets,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/transmission-emerging-asmajor-stumbling-block-for-state-renewable-targets.
40
Twelve States Produced 80% of U.S. Wind Power in 2013, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (April 15, 2014),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=15851.
41
See Shreve & Schauer, supra note 5.
42
See, e.g., Z. BEDNARIKOVA, R. HILLBERRY, N. NGUYEN, I. KUMAR, T. INANI, M. GORDON, & M.
WILCOX, AN EXAMINATION OF THE COMMUNITY LEVEL DYNAMICS RELATED TO THE INTRODUCTION OF WIND
ENERGY IN INDIANA 16 (2020), https://cdext.purdue.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Wind-Energy_Finalreport.pdf (estimating $7.5 to $15 million in annual lease payments to landowners in Indiana who host wind
farms).
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some agricultural uses of land such as cattle grazing. 43 Furthermore, when
renewable energy generation is built in struggling communities, such as those
losing coal mining or other fossil fuel jobs, tax payments and other proceeds
from renewable energy development can provide at least a partial lifeline. 44 But
there are substantial downsides to large renewables too, such as aesthetic and
non-climate environmental impacts, changes in the culture and character of
communities, and potential safety hazards from inadequate decommissioning. 45
All types of major infrastructural expansions, whether they involve
highways, pipelines, or towering transmission lines, have enduring effects, as
explored here in the context of a green revolution.
A. Durable Renewable Energy Infrastructure: Land Use and Environmental
Impacts and Path Dependence
Energy is a notoriously land-intensive activity. Growing U.S. demand for
energy will be the largest driver of land conversion over the next two decades. 46
New domestic energy development in the form of natural gas and oil wells,
renewable generation, and other power sources will occupy an area larger than
Texas. 47 Large-scale renewable energy built as part of the green revolution will
therefore be a major contributor to the conversion of “greenfields”—currently
undeveloped land. 48 Indeed, in 2015, 1.4 million U.S. homes were located within

43
See Cathy Svejkovsky, Renewable Energy Opportunities on the Farm, ATTRA 10 (2006),
https://attra.ncat.org/product/Renewable-Energy-Opportunities-on-the-Farm/.
44
See BEDNARIKOVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 22–25 (noting property tax payments); Silvio Marcacci,
Renewable Energy Job Boom Creates Economic Opportunity as Coal Industry Slumps, FORBES (Apr. 22, 2019,
7:20 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2019/04/22/renewable-energy-job-boom-creatingeconomic-opportunity-as-coal-industry-slumps/?sh=75c79e543665.
45
See, e.g., Uma Outka, Environmental Justice Issues in Sustainable Development: Environmental
Justice in the Renewable Energy Transition, 19 J. ENV’T & SUSTAINABILITY L. 60, 77–79 (2012) (noting
aesthetic and cultural concerns). Some renewable generation facilities are repowered (with the addition of new
solar panels on top of existing racks, for example) rather than decommissioned, but some of the old equipment
still must be scrapped. For a discussion of decommissioning and repowering, see, e.g., Billy Ludt, How to
Decommission a Solar Array, and Why It’s Important to Plan Ahead, SOLAR POWER WORLD (Mar. 11, 2019),
https://www.solarpowerworldonline.com/2019/03/how-to-decommission-a-solar-array-and-why-its-importantto-plan-ahead/.
46
Anne M. Trainor, Robert I. McDonald & Joseph Fargione, Energy Sprawl Is the Largest Driver of
Land Use Change in the United States, PLOS ONE (2016). https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/
journal.pone.0162269.
47
Id. This figure includes the need to space apart wells and energy generation infrastructure.
48
Sara Bronin highlighted this problem even before the green energy revolution, noting “the everincreasing consumption of land, particularly in rural areas, required to site energy generation facilities.” Bronin,
supra note 18, at 547; see also Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 241 (2011)
(highlighting the land-intensive nature of large-scale renewables and transmission lines).
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eight or fewer kilometers of wind farms—a figure that will rise if the United
States moves toward 100% zero-carbon power. 49
Some experts paint a rosier picture. For example, the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (NREL) notes that “[w]e would need only 10 million acres
of land—or only 0.4% of the land area of the United States—to supply all of our
nation’s electricity” using solar photovoltaic (PV) panels. 50 When compared to
the 30 million acres of farmland that the federal government purposefully takes
out of production each year, or the 243 million acres of land in the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge, NREL experts view this land use requirement as
relatively small. 51 And NREL emphasizes that in 2004, “cities and residences
covered about 140 million acres of land” in the United States, which could easily
house PV panels over parking lots and on rooftops. 52 Only 7% of existing built
land in the United States, including, for example, roadways and parking lots,
would be required to house PV panels that would fulfill all current U.S. demand
for electricity. 53 Additionally, some scientists point out that the alternative to a
renewable build-out—relying primarily on fossil fuels—can have similarly large
landscape effects because new wells and mines must be drilled and dug as
production decreases from existing extraction sites. 54
Even if the acreage required for large-scale renewable energy is relatively
minor as compared to other land uses, communities will still see major changes
to their landscapes. More wind farms will sprout up in farm fields and on the
ridges of hills and mountain, and acres of solar panels will cover fields and
deserts. 55 Residents will also experience flashing lights on top of wind turbines,
shadows from moving wind turbine blades, and in some cases, abandoned
infrastructure if generation is not properly decommissioned. 56 Dolar PV panels
49
Ben Hoen, Jeremy Firestone, Joseph Rand, Debi Elliot, Gundula Hübner, Johannes Pohl, Ryan Wiser,
Eric Lantz, T. Ryan Haac, & Ken Kaliski, Attitudes of U.S. Wind Turbine Neighbors: Analysis of a Nationwide
Survey, 134 ENERGY POL’Y. 1, 1 (2019).
50
See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, NATL. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., PV FAQS, supra note 17, at 1.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
See Trainor et al., supra note 46, at 6 (“Renewable energy sources can reuse the same land every year,
such that there is no increase in cumulative land required. In contrast, the land required to acquire extractive
energy sources expands every year.”).
55
Wind Turbine Heights and Capacities Have Increased Over the Past Decade, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=33912#:~:text=Since%202012%2C
%20the%20average%20height,such%20as%20trees%20or%20buildings (“Favorable sites for wind turbines
include the tops of smooth, rounded hills; open plains and water; and mountain gaps that funnel and intensify
wind.”).
56
See, e.g., Sean F. Nolon, Negotiating the Wind: A Framework to Engage Citizens in Siting Wind
Turbines, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 327, 338–39 (2011) (summarizing some of the impacts of large-
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will also cover thousands of acres of land, and, like wind, will change landscapes
and impact wildlife habitat. 57
This is not to say that large-scale renewables are predominantly
objectionable. Indeed, many studies find that residents on the whole support
these projects—particularly residents who move to communities after the
projects have been built. 58 And many farmers, in particular, welcome the cash
flow offered by renewables, making more money from lease payments than from
crops. 59 But a non-trivial number of residents will object, and to the extent that
impacts can be feasibly avoided through alternative, small-scale energy, more
localized, small energy will be a preferable approach. 60
Beyond occupying a substantial amount of land, a large-scale green energy
revolution will create a durable infrastructural web. Indeed, more than 70% of
existing transmission lines in the United States are 25 years old or older,
demonstrating the long life of this type of infrastructure. 61 If increasingly
common small-scale technologies such as home batteries, hydrogen fuel cells,
and solar shingles become even cheaper and more accessible, stranded
transmission lines could become an expensive, cumbersome project to
decommission, somewhat analogous to the expensive nuclear plants that now sit
idle, yet require billions in mothballing costs. 62 Still worse, a broad network of
large-scale renewable farms and transmission lines could distract from or even
outcompete further progress in the installation of small-scale renewables and
energy efficiency. This could happen if limited government subsidies for energy
focused too much on the large-scale side, leaving funding for distributed energy
applications as an afterthought.

scale renewables).
57
Airport authorities and other objectors have also expressed concerns about glare from solar panels,
although NREL observes that “PV modules exhibit less glare than windows and water.” See Megan Day &
Benjamin Mow, Research and Analysis Demonstrate the Lack of Impacts of Glare from Photovoltaic Modules,
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (July 31, 2018), https://www.nrel.gov/state-local-tribal/blog/posts/researchand-analysis-demonstrate-the-lack-of-impacts-of-glare-from-photovoltaic-modules.html.
58
See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
59
Gerrard, supra note 8, at 10602.
60
See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 17, at 561 (highlighting the benefits of microgrids, which require less
sprawling infrastructure).
61
See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, Chapter 3: Enabling Modernization of the Electric Power System, in
QUADRENNIAL TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 2015, at 3 https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/09/f26/QTR2015
-3F-Transmission-and-Distribution_1.pdf.
62
See, e.g., Jeffrey Collins, Mothballed Reactors: Fight over South Carolina Utility Fees, AP (Apr. 25,
2018), https://apnews.com/article/cbd58bd29a6b4c8a83cb6d96d643954a.
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Beyond creating durable infrastructure that occupies thousands of acres of
land, renewable energy has environmental impacts, although it is important to
contextualize these impacts. 63 The environmental impacts of renewable energy
are lower than those of fossil fuels, and they pale in comparison to the mass
wildlife extinctions likely to be wrought by climate change. 64 But solar and wind
farms do disrupt the habitats of endangered species, and wind farms kill bats and
birds (although fewer birds than some other types of power plants kill). 65
Further, the production of solar panels and batteries requires rare metals and
produces hazardous waste. 66
63
See Jeffrey E. Lovich & Joshua R. Ennen, Wildlife Conservation and Solar Energy Development in the
Desert Southwest, United States, 61 BIOSCIENCE 982 (2011) (summarizing the environmental impacts of
renewable energy).
64
See José Antonio Sánchez-Zapata, Miguel Clavero, Martina Carrete, Travis L. DeVault & Virgilio
Hermoso, Effects of Renewable Energy Production and Infrastructure on Wildlife, USDA NAT’L WILDLIFE
RSCH. CTR. – STAFF PUBL’NS 97, 105–10 (2016), https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
2843&context=icwdm_usdanwrc (cataloguing the environmental impacts of solar and wind but noting that
solutions for wildlife impacts from wind are “relatively straightforward” as opposed to solutions for the wildlife
impacts of fossil-fuel and nuclear power plants, which are spread “across large scales”); Edgard G. Hertwich,
Thomas Gibon, Evert A. Bouman, Anders Arvesen, Sangwon Suh, Garvin A. Heath, Joseph D. Bergesen,
Andrea Ramirez, Bael I. Vega & Lei Shi, Integrated Life-Cycle Assessment of Electricity-Supply Scenarios
Confirms Global Environmental Benefit of Low-Carbon Technologies, 112 PNAS 6277, 6278 (2014) (through
a life cycle analysis of the environmental impacts of fossil-based and renewable technologies, which examines
the impacts of manufacturing and operating generating equipment, concluding that “renewable energy
technologies have significantly lower pollution-related environmental impacts per unit of generation”).
65
See, e.g., W.F. Frick, E.F. Baerwald, J.F. Pollock, R.M.R. Barclay, J.A. Szymanski, T.J. Weller, A.L.
Russell, S.C. Loeb, R.A. Medellin & L.P. McGuire, Fatalities at Wind Turbines May Threaten Population
Viability of a Migratory Bat, 209 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 172 (2017); LAURA E. ELLISON, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, BATS AND WIND ENERGY—A LITERATURE SYNTHESIS AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY,
1–2 (2012), https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2012/1110/OF12-1110.pdf (noting bird and bat deaths, although observing
that with the introduction of newer forms of turbines, bird deaths have decreased); Benjamin K. Sovacool,
Contextualizing Avian Mortality: A Preliminary Appraisal of Bird and Bat Fatalities from Wind, Fossil-Fuel,
and Nuclear Electricity, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 2241 (2009) (noting that wind farms kill fewer birds than other forms
of energy generation). But see Sánchez-Zapata et al., supra note 64, at 110 (noting that Sovacool’s observation
could become moot as wind energy becomes more commonplace).
66
See Damien Giurco, Elsa Dominish, Nick Florin, Takuma Watari, & Benjamin McLellan,
Requirements for Minerals and Metals for 100% Renewable Scenarios, in ACHIEVING THE PARIS CLIMATE
AGREEMENT GOALS 437 (Sven Teske ed., 2019) (noting negative impacts of mining metals for PV panels,
including, for example, the sourcing of metals from the Democratic Republic of Congo (where there are human
rights-based concerns); INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES, SUSTAINABILITY EVALUATION OF ENERGY STORAGE
TECHNOLOGIES, at vii (2018), https://acola.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/wp3-sustainability-evaluationenergy-storage-full-report.pdf (noting that impacts from the mining, transport, production, and end use of energy
storage technologies vary, but providing the example of impacts in China from mining, including “contamination
of air, water and soil from lead, graphite and phosphate mining”). But see Hertwich et al., supra note 64, at 6280
(noting that initial materials requirements are higher per unit of renewable electricity but also noting “the long
lifetime of the equipment, and the ability to recycle the metals,” and concluding that a scenario involving
predominantly renewable, as opposed to fossil, energy would require less cement and iron as compared to current
materials requirements, but would increase reliance on aluminum and copper); Md. Shahariar Chowdhury, Kaz
S. Rahman, Tanjia Chowdhury, Narissara Nuthammachot, Kuaanan Techato, Md. Akhtaruzzaman, Sieh Kiong
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Regardless of the scales of renewable technologies prioritized, the green
revolution will produce some of these impacts. The impacts are small compared
to the sweeping changes to be wrought by climate change, and they do not justify
stalling the move toward lower-carbon energy. But these impacts should not be
ignored, and policymakers should follow pathways to renewable energy that
produce fewer environmental and social effects. 67 A movement that prioritizes
reductions in energy use through energy efficiency—better insulation in
buildings and more efficient appliances, for example—will require fewer
additions of generation infrastructure and transmission lines and will lessen
environmental impacts. 68 And solar PV panels placed on rooftops, over parking
lots (with the added benefit of protecting cars and their passengers from the
elements), and along highways would only have to occupy approximately 7% of
the nation’s existing built infrastructure. 69 Airports, too, offer prime sites for
solar energy. They already have large, open spaces with relatively little wildlife,
and concerns about glare from the panels have largely proven to be unfounded. 70
More nuanced analyses that investigate relatively uncluttered and unshaded
rooftops—meaning that few changes would have to be made prior to panel
installation—suggest that rooftop solar on existing buildings could cover an
impressive 39% of U.S. electricity sales. 71

Tiong, Kamaruzzaman Sopian & Howshad Amin, An Overview of Solar Photovoltaic Panels’ End-of-Life
Material Recycling, 27 ENERGY STRATEGY REVIEWS 100431, at 4 (2020) (noting two types of commercially
available solar photovoltaic recycling technologies but observing that few places, aside from the EU, have
recycling requirements).
67
See, e.g., Sanchez-Zapata, supra note 60, at 114 (concluding that “[f]ighting climate change is one of
the major challenges of contemporary society and renewable energies are a key instrument to reduce greenhouse
emissions” but arguing for approaches to renewable energy that minimize and mitigate impacts).
68
See, e.g., id. (observing that “the greener energy is the one that is not consumed, so reducing energy
consumption should be the highest priority to minimize the effects of energy production on ecosystems and
wildlife”).
69
PV FAQS, supra note 50, at 1. For a discussion of the benefits of siting solar along highways, see, e.g.,
Tina Hodges & Amy Plovnick, Renewable Roadsides, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP.: FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. (2019),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/19winter/04.cfm.
70
See Day & Mow, supra note 57 (concluding that “PV modules have been installed without incident at
many airports”); Evan Riley & Scott Olson, A Study of the Hazardous Glare Potential to Aviators from UtilityScale Flat Plate Photovoltaic Systems, 2011 ISRN RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 4 (2011), https://downloads.hindawi.
com/archive/2011/651857.pdf (concluding that “the potential for hazardous glare from flat-plate PV systems is
similar to that of smooth water and not expected to be a hazard to air navigation”).
71
Gagnon et al., supra note 18, at v. This estimate is based on an investigation of accessible roof space
in 128 cities; the survey covered “approximately 23% of U.S. buildings.” Id.
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B. Political Economy and Voter Psychology in the Energy Sphere
Beyond its infrastructural and land-based impacts, an energy revolution that
relegated small-scale energy to a minor position could perpetuate and exacerbate
political economic problems. 72 Replacing more than 60% of U.S. energy
infrastructure with large-scale renewables would change the character of many
agricultural communities. 73 Indeed, utility-scale renewable development is
already causing some consternation among rural residents concerned about the
displacement of productive agricultural lands and the transformation of
community character. 74 The “farming” of energy is positive in many ways,
producing new economic opportunities and often allowing both farming and
energy production on the same land, thus preserving struggling farms. But the
social- and land-use-based changes driven by renewable energy development in
rural communities are real, and not wholly positive. 75 Rural opposition to
renewable energy is only heightened by the human psychological factors that
serve as barriers to climate policies.
1. The Psychology of Climate Change
Human psychology is a broad-based obstacle for any policies focused on
lowering carbon emissions. Even individuals who are passionately concerned
about climate change take many actions that contribute to the climate crisis—
72
Matthew J. Burke & Jennie C. Stephens, Political Power and Renewable Energy Futures: A Critical
Review, 35 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 78, 78 (2018) (noting that “[i]n many cases, local conflicts around
renewables [sic] energy installations, especially wind power but also solar facilities, have delayed or even halted
the uptake of renewables, mirroring the many worldwide historical conflicts around the development of
technologies such as hydroelectric and nuclear power”); Uma Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift:
Learning from Environmental Justice, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 793 (2017) (emphasizing that “there is a unique
and time-sensitive context for justice concerns in the energy transition” because “change is happening quickly
and discordant notions of fairness are competing for validation in the energy policy space”).
73
Note, however, that many farmers welcome renewable energy projects for the lease income that they
produce. See supra notes 42 and 59 and accompanying text.
74
See, e.g., BEDNARIKOVA ET AL., supra note 42, at 73–78 (describing some Indiana rural communities’
opposition to wind farms).
75
See, e.g., Jesse Fernandes, Natalie Flynn, Samantha Gibbes, Matthew Griffis, Takahiro Isshiki, Sean
Killian, Laura Palombi, Nerissa Rujanavech, Sarah Tomsky & Meredith Tondro, Renewable Energy in the
California Desert, Mechanisms for Evaluating Solar Development on Public Lands, (Apr. 2010) (Master of
Science project, University of Michigan School of Natural Resources and the Environment) ch. 8, 5–7,
http://webservices.itcs.umich.edu/drupal/recd/sites/webservices.itcs.umich.edu.drupal.recd/files/Chapter%208
%20Socioeconomic%20Impact%20Analysis.pdf (full report available at https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/
2027.42/69249) (summarizing the literature and noting positive impacts such as monetary contributions to the
local tax base and individual landowners and negative ones such as community tensions “where the economic
benefits of a wind farm are not shared equally among the residents,” negative impacts on a “community’s ability
to hike and camp in the area,” and, to some degree, declines in tourism, among other impacts, and describing
similar potential impacts from solar).
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flying for vacations, work, and family visits, for example, or purchasing a
convenient, relatively large vehicle despite being able to afford an electric car.
This is, in part, due to the free rider/public goods problem inherent to a crisis
caused by the actions of more than 6 billion humans. 76 Rational individuals
know that their actions, individually, do very little to stem the rising tide of
carbon emissions. Although their actions might inspire others in a small
community to also change their behavior, this is trivial compared to the major
emissions reductions that global or national carbon abatement policies
produce. 77 Relatedly, rational individuals know that the expenditures and
sacrifices that they make to reduce carbon emissions provide benefits (albeit tiny
ones) for a freeriding, nonpaying public, meaning that these individuals bear
costs for which they are not wholly compensated.
Even the presence of national climate legislation would not erase this
problem. Asking communities to endure a fast-paced, large-scale change for a
global cause—on which many other countries can free ride—has been an
unpopular proposition for some. 78 And although renewable energy in some
regions is less expensive than coal and natural gas, in other regions electricity
prices will rise. 79 Human psychology suggests that individuals prefer to avoid
certain losses (such as the loss of money through higher electricity bills) over
uncertain ones (such as potential injuries from climate change). 80 Further,
residents in host communities for transmission lines and large-scale renewable
energy generation will experience concrete, current injuries while seeing future,
unpredictable, globally distributed benefits in the form of a lower threat of
accelerated climate change and its impacts. And with the knowledge that even
Many other factors contribute, too. See, e.g., JANET SWIM ET AL., AM. PSYCH ASS’N TASK FORCE ON
BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PSYCHOLOGY OF GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE: ADDRESSING A MULTI-FACETED PHENOMENON AND SET OF CHALLENGES 84–85, https://www.apa.org/
science/about/publications/climate-change.pdf (summarizing the literature and noting that in addition to
humans’ awareness of the “magnitude of climate change threats and perceived inability to affect their outcomes,”
other psychological barriers include, for example, “splitting” knowledge of the problem from emotional
responses to the problem, in part as an emotional defense mechanism, and, for those who have not embraced
climate change as a reality, active denial and “disinterest associated with external locus of control and fatalism”).
77
See, e.g., Kimberly S. Wolske, Kenneth T. Gillingham & P. Wesley Schultz, Peer Influence on
Household Energy Behaviours, 5 NATURE ENERGY 202, 203 (2020) (summarizing the literature that has
documented peer effects “based on spatial proximity,” such as rooftop solar installations inspiring others in a
neighborhood to adopt similar technologies).
78
See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299,
302 (2000).
79
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COSTS OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2021, at 22, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf (showing
regional cost variation); Shreve & Schauer, supra note 5 (estimating the cost of a transition to 100% clean
energy).
80
Rachlinski, supra note 78, at 309.
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major emissions reductions will not quickly reduce the amount of carbon in the
atmosphere due to its atmospheric life, these benefits could seem even more
tenuous. 81
2. Rural Politics
Just as psychological factors present in all humans—regardless of their
political ilk—serve as impediments to low-carbon energy policies, the specific
geography of a green energy revolution focused on “big energy” is likely to
make matters worse. A U.S. green revolution will not be evenly distributed.
Because the areas with the most sunlight, wind, and open space tend to be rural,
new development will predominantly occur in areas that overwhelmingly
oppose Democratic policies, and particularly climate policies. 82 Nationwide
surveys suggest overall positive attitudes toward large-scale renewable
installations such as wind energy, particularly when developers adequately
engage with and listen to community concerns. 83 But regardless of their political
bent, a non-trivial number of residents find centralized, large-scale energy
development to be aesthetically displeasing and object to its interruption of
landscapes, impacts on wildlife, and transformation of rural economies. 84 In the
81
See, e.g., Piers M. Forster et al., Current and Future Global Climate Change Impacts from COVID-19,
10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 913, 913 (2020) (describing how drastic emissions cuts during the COVID-19
pandemic will do very little to lower global temperatures by 2030).
82
The vast majority of existing U.S. renewable power sources are large, centralized sources. See, e.g.,
WOOD MACKENZIE, U.S. SOLAR MARKET INSIGHT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Q4 2020, at 12–14 (noting that in the
third quarter of 2020, 2.7 gigawatts of utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) were installed in the United States
and 1,167 megawatts of distributed (residential and commercial) solar were installed during this same time
period). Nearly all large-scale renewable energy to date is in rural areas, where voters tend to support Republican
policies. See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, WIND WORKS FOR AMERICA, http://windworksforamerica.awea.org/
(last visited January 6, 2021) (99% of U.S. wind capacity built to date is in the rural United States); Richard C.
Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1167 (2018) (describing the growing urbanrural divide in politics and observing that in the 2016 election, “Clinton won the popular vote on the votes of
urban citizens; Trump won the presidency on the votes of everyone else”).
83
Hoen et al., supra note 49, at 2 (noting that “[t]ypically, researchers have found local attitudes to be
largely positive,” but observing differences in terms of whether residents moved to a community before or after
wind turbines were constructed).
84
See, e.g., Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (noting plaintiffs’
objections to the “visual impact” of wind farm in addition to “turbines’ blinking lights, the shadow flicker affect
they create early in the morning and late at night, and their operational noises”); Muscarello v. Winnebago Cnty.
Bd., 702 F.3d. 909, 910–11 (7th Cir. 2012) (summarizing an agricultural land owner’s objections to potential
wind farms, including “subjecting [the property] to ‘shadow flicker and reduction of light,’ ‘severe noise,’
‘possible ‘ice throw’ (from buildup of ice on spinning blades), and ‘blade throws’ (the blades of the windmill
might fly off while spinning); interfering with radar, cell phone, GPS, television, and other wireless
communications; creating an increased likelihood of lightning damage and stray voltage; increasing
electromagnetic radiation; preventing crop dusting (presumably the concern is that crop-dusting aircraft might
be endangered by the wind turbines); drying out her land; and killing raptors, thus compelling her to use more
pesticides”); Yates v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 2018 WL 2033290, at *1 (D. Or., Apr. 30, 2018) (objecting to
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many rural areas where voters are already suspicious of Democrat-led initiatives,
the construction of thousands of large solar and wind farms in predominantly
agricultural communities threatens to expand opposition to the clean energy
push. Indeed, in an example of the extent to which some Republicans oppose
technologies such as wind energy, when Texas Agricultural Commissioner Sid
Miller incorrectly identified wind energy as the primary cause of the 2021 Texas
blackout (colloquially, “SNOVID”), he referred to wind turbines as “energyrobbing Obama Monuments.” 85
Given that utility-scale renewable farms are typically built by large
corporations, a green energy revolution focused too heavily on large-scale
energy would also support the increasingly common populist argument that
Democrats represent “Wall Street bankers and special interests,” not common
people. 86 Indeed, although this generalization is inaccurate (corporate donations
to Republicans also abound), reliance on “big energy” could potentially give
large corporations outsized influence in the energy transition. 87 This detracts
the impacts of solar farm construction, including, for example, frequent truck traffic; “wire, junk, and large
stacks of wooden pallets”; and the use of large equipment for compacting fill dirt); Spence, supra note 13
(documenting widespread opposition to renewables by communities and environmental nonprofit
organizations); Hannah J. Wiseman, Taxing Local Energy Externalities, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 563 (2020)
(similarly documenting opposition to large-scale renewable energy); BEDNARIKOVA ET AL., supra note 42, at
73–78 (noting some Indiana communities’ opposition to wind farms and the movements that coalesced to support
local bans and other restrictive ordinances). As explored further in Part IV, there is also opposition to rooftop
solar—particularly in historic neighborhoods and communities run by homeowners’ association—but the
majority of states already have policies that limit this opposition to some degree.
85
Erin Douglas & Ross Ramsey, No, Frozen Wind Turbines Aren’t the Main Culprit for Texas’ Power
Outages, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Feb. 17, 2021, 5:31 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/weather/2021/
02/17/no-frozen-wind-turbines-arent-the-main-culprit-for-texas-power-outages/ (quoting from a Facebook post
by Commissioner Miller).
86
Remarks by President Trump on the Election, Nov. 5, 2020 (on file with author); NextEra energy owns
and operates 16% of the wind farms in the United States, and NextEra is the world’s largest electric utility.
Renewable Energy, NEXTERA ENERGY http://www.nexteraenergy.com/sustainability/environment/renewableenergy.html (last visited May 12, 2021); Our Company, NEXTERA ENERGY http://www.nexteraenergy.com/
company.html (last visited May 12, 2021) (noting that “NextEra Energy is the world’s largest utility company”);
NEXTERA ENERGY, INVESTING IN AMERICA’S ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SUSTAINABLY AND RESPONSIBLY
(2017), http://www.nexteraenergy.com/pdf/profile.pdf.
87
See, e.g., Burke & Stephens, supra note 72, at 79 (noting the rise of the “energy democracy” movement,
which advocates for “decentralized, democratized, and community-based renewable energy futures” and “calls
for reclaiming the energy sector and shifting political power to workers, households, communities, and the
public, in opposition to a centralized, corporate, utility-scale renewable energy model”). For examples of
corporate donations to Republicans, see, e.g., Who are the Biggest Organization Donors?, OPENSECRETS,
https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/top-organizations (last visited Apr. 9, 2021) (showing organizations such
as Koch Industries and Energy Transfer LP that made millions of dollars in contributions to Republican
candidates in 2019–20). Although Republicans, like Democrats, receive large amounts of corporate donations,
it is true that the Republican party is now substantially funded by grassroots donations. See, e.g., James Oliphant,
Jason Lange, Julia Harte & Tim Reid, Republication Donations Surge Despite Corporate Boycott After Capitol
Riots, REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2021, 6:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics-republican-donations-
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from the potential for bottom-up, community-driven energy in which residents
choose the source of their clean energy and where and how it is produced. 88
The “capture” theory of the political process posits that well-organized
interests with large stakes in the outcome of a policymaking decision can unduly
dominate the process that leads to that decision. 89 Even though collectively, the
public at large would experience more impacts, individual benefits and costs to
each member of the public are smaller than the benefits and costs experienced
by smaller, individual, organized interests. And the transaction costs of
organizing to lobby are high for the public. 90 There are numerous critiques of
this theory, including, for example, the simple empirical observation that many
regulations that benefit the diffuse public have been promulgated. 91 Publicinterested regulations can emerge because lobbying by wealthy firms can
produce political counterweights, including new alignments of interests
antithetical to the most powerful interests. 92
Despite these and other critiques, in some circumstances, it appears that the
largest industry players still have the upper hand in the political process
depending on their wealth and their long-running connections to decisionmakers. Perhaps the starkest example of industry capture in the energy sector
comes from the coal mining industry in West Virginia, where large coal
companies dominated the state legislature and courts; they used this leverage to

ins/republican-donations-surge-despite-corporate-boycott-after-capitol-riots-idUSKBN2B118K (noting that
“Republican fundraising operations supporting Senate and House candidates raked in a combined $15.8 million
in January alone on the strength of small-dollar donations”).
88
Shalanda Baker explores in depth the potential for energy to be transformative if placed in the hands
of people who have historically lacked power over the energy system and have shouldered the bulk of the
system’s burdens. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 11, at 30–33 (exploring the potentially transformative benefits of
rooftop solar, net metering, and community energy if access to these resources were expanded to low-income
populations).
89
See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction,
101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1342–43 (2013).
90
See, e.g., id. (defining capture).
91
See, e.g., Matthew Wansley, Virtuous Capture, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 422 (2015) (noting many
“examples of regulations that do impose costs on the concentrated, wealthy repeat player interest groups and
generate benefits to a diffuse public”).
92
See, e.g., id. at 433. Furthermore, interest groups with power in the political process do not only include
traditional corporations. They also encompass powerful national environmental groups that tend to receive more
contributions when lobbying by traditional corporations is perceived to overly sway decisionmakers and produce
damaging results. Cf. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 473 (2003) (describing interest groups as those
that “seek to further the objectives of their members as factors of production or producers,” as well as those that
“seek to influence public policy or public opinion with respect to particular public good-externality issues,”
including “environmental groups”).
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influence federal regulation and enforcement of the environmental and safetybased aspects of coal mining. 93
Large-scale wind and solar industries, like other forms of energy
development, involve many large corporations. 94 And while none appear to have
exhibited behavior that rises to the level of coal industry influence in West
Virginia, they do have powerful political sway. For example, the world’s largest
utility has the largest market share in both solar and wind capacity in the United
States, representing 16% of the U.S. wind market and 11% of the U.S. solar
market. 95 This utility, headquartered in Florida, has been a leader on the path to
cleaner energy in the United States, but it is also known for having outsized
influence with the Florida Legislature and the state’s agency that regulates
utilities. 96 This utility and three other large utilities in Florida spent $20 million
to support a failed ballot initiative that would have constrained distributed solar
expansion in Florida. 97
Large-scale energy, in short, often involves large companies with substantial
political sway. Calls for the democratization of energy emphasize that
decentralized renewables place power in the hands of individuals and
communities rather than large corporations. 98
C. Environmental Justice
A rapid expansion of large-scale renewable energy and high-voltage
transmission lines, some of which could be avoided through small-scale energy,
will not only threaten to extend the power of wealthy interests; it will also impact
hundreds of communities. Communities hosting new wind and solar farms will
benefit from an increased tax base or payments in lieu of taxes, and some job

93
See, e.g., Hugh M. Caperton v. Massey Coal, 556 U.S. 868, 872–73 (2009) (noting Massey Coal’s
chairman Don Blankenship’s $3 million in contributions to an attorney’s political organization and ads and the
ultimate victory of that attorney in a West Virginia Supreme Court election, followed by a West Virginia
Supreme Court reversal of a $50 million jury verdict against Massey).
94
See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
95
See supra note 86.
96
The nonpartisan group Integrity Florida reports that Florida Power and Light made nearly $15 million
in state-level political contributions in 2016. ALAN STEONCIPHER, BRAD ASHWELL & BEN WILCOX, INTEGRITY
FLORIDA: POWER PLAY REDUX: POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF FLORIDA’S TOP ENERGY CORPORATIONS 5 (2018),
https://www.integrityflorida.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Power-Play-Redux-final.pdf.
97
Elizabeth Koh, Political Spending by Utilities Has Jumped, Boosted by Opposition to Rooftop Solar,
MIA. HERALD (May 17, 2018, 3:34 PM) https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/
article211235624.html.
98
See supra note 87.
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creation, if renewable energy developers hire employees locally. 99 But they will
also experience the land use and other harms explored in Part I.A. This raises
serious environmental justice concerns, which arise when developers site
LULUs in communities where residents lack the money, time, and other
resources needed to powerfully lobby for land uses more tailored to community
needs. 100 As with other forms of energy development, many of the effects of
renewable energy generation and transmission lines are highly localized—
indeed, even more so than fossil fuel-fired plants, as renewables do not emit
pollution that travels across municipal and state lines. 101 Yet the benefits are
widespread. This creates a classic environmental justice problem in which the
communities least equipped to effectively fight the siting of renewables are
likely to shoulder the burdens of these technologies, with the broader, more
distant public reaping the benefits. 102 Indeed, there is a real threat that
transmission lines for new large-scale renewable energy generation will be
predominantly located in low-income areas because it is cheaper to condemn
low-value land. 103
D. Reliability of the Electricity Supply
A final concern associated with a rapid transition to predominantly largescale renewables is the reliability of the electricity supply. The challenge for grid
99
See BEDNARIKOVA ET AL., supra note 42 (describing benefits in Indiana); GILBERT MICHAUD,
CHRISTELLE KHALAF, MICHAEL ZIMMER, & DAVID JENKINS, UTIL. SCALE SOLAR ENERGY COAL. OHIO,
MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF UTILITY-SCALE SOLAR IN OHIO (2020), https://www.ohio.edu/
voinovich-school/sites/ohio.edu.voinovich-school/files/sites/voinovich-school/files/Michaud%20G.%20et%
20al.%20(2020).%20Measuring%20the%20Economic%20Impacts%20of%20Utility-Scale%20Solar%20in%
20Ohio%20—-%20FINAL%20REPORT%2C%208.31.2020.pdf.
100
These concerns are primarily distributive, meaning that communities—often low-income
communities—tend to shoulder a disproportionate burden of the impacts of energy. But these concerns also
involve procedural injustice, which refers to inadequate consideration of communities’ needs and concerns, and
recognition-based injustice, which describes inadequate knowledge, understanding, and acknowledgement of
inequities. For the formation and further description of this tripartite definition of energy injustices, see Kirsten
Jenkins, Darren McCauley, Raphael Heffron, Hannes Stephan & Robert Rehner, Energy Justice: A Conceptual
Review, 11 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 174 (2016).
101
Cf. SAMANTHA GROSS, BROOKINGS INST., RENEWABLES, LAND USE, AND LOCAL OPPOSITION IN THE
UNITED STATES 10 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/FP_20200113_renewables
_land_use_local_opposition_gross.pdf (noting that “[a] frequent complaint” about large-scale wind energy
projects “is that the power produced in these projects is not needed locally and will only benefit people in cities
far away” and noting the many localized impacts).
102
A.M. Levenda, I. Behrsin & F. Disano, Renewable Energy for Whom? A Global Systemic Review of
the Environmental Justice Implications of Renewable Energy Technologies, 71 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI.
101837 (2021).
103
Cf. James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain, 104 MINN. L. REV. 659,
730-32 (2019) (exploring challenges with the “fair market value” approach to compensating landowners for
condemned property and analyzing alternatives involving compensation in excess of fair market value).
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operators is that the amount of electricity sent through transmission and
distribution lines must nearly exactly match the amount of electricity used by
customers on an instantaneous basis. 104 Grid operators accomplish this delicate
balancing of supply and load, thus avoiding over- and under-voltages in the
wires, by planning for the availability of reserve generation that can quickly
come online; engaging demand response tools in which customers pre-commit
to reducing electricity use during periods of peak demand; and forecasting the
overall supply of electricity needed. 105
This delicate, complex system can fail spectacularly, as most recently
highlighted by the polar vortex event in Texas and neighboring states. Residents
in the lower Midwest—particularly Texas—were without power for days, with
temperatures inside homes reaching dangerous lows, critical medical support
failing, and many water pipes freezing and bursting. 106 The causes of this
widespread power outage were numerous and complex. Texas relies on wind
power and natural gas to fulfill much of its energy demand. 107 Coal and nuclear
energy also provide some electricity in Texas. 108 But during the cold snap, wind
generation decreased slightly, in part because some wind turbines froze, and,
more importantly, natural gas generation failed dramatically. 109 At the same
time, load increased astronomically as residents and businesses turned heating
systems to their maximum capacity in an effort to stay warm.110As electricity
104
See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 1252 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, at x (2006), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_Benefits_of_Demand_Response_in_Electricity_Markets_and_Recommen
dations_for_Achieving_Them_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
105
Id. at x–xi.
106
See Jack Healey, Richard Fausset & James Dobbins Cracked Pipes, Frozen Wells, Offline Treatment
Plants: A Texan Water Crisis, NY TIMES (Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/18/us/texas-watercrisis-winter-storm.html.
107
Texas Profile Analysis, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/state/
analysis.php?sid=TX (Noting that “[n]atural gas-fired power plants supplied more than half of the state’s
electricity net generation in 2019” and “wind energy provided more than one-sixth of Texas’s generation” in the
same year).
108
See Magness, supra note 16, at 4 (describing this balancing).
109
Wind outages were not the primary cause of the problem in Texas. See, e.g., PATRICK MILLIGAN, ICF,
WINTER STORMS WREAK HAVOC ON ERCOT GRID 1 (2021), https://go.icf.com/rs/072-WJX-782/images/
ICF%20-%20Winter%20Storms%20Wreak%20Havoc%20on%20ERCOT%20Grid.pdf (“Total wind output is
slightly below expectations, but the main supply issue is lack of available thermal generation (both gas and coal)
due to freezing conditions.”); Magness, supra note 16, at 14 (showing that natural gas plants had more outages
than any other type of generation during the extreme cold event).
110
See, e.g., OFF. OF CYBERSECURITY, ENERGY SECURITY, AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. DEPT. OF
ENERGY, SITUATION REPORT: EXTREME COLD & WINTER WEATHER UPDATE #1 (2021), https://www.energy.
gov/sites/prod/files/2021/02/f82/TLP-WHITE_DOE%20Situation%20Update_Cold%20%20Winter%20
Weather_%231.pdf (noting “record winter power demand” in Texas).
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outages began, electrified natural gas compressors necessary to push gas through
pipelines to power plants stopped working, electric pumps that help to pull
natural gas from producing wells and storage also shut down, and components
on gas wells and pipelines froze, as did components at the natural gas plants
themselves. 111 Some coal and nuclear plants also experienced generation
declines. 112
Politicians were quick to blame wind for the debacle, and they were incorrect
to do so; natural gas outages were the predominant cause of the blackout. 113 But
it is true that extensive renewable energy penetration in the generation mix can
cause reliability challenges if not managed properly. For example, when wind
and solar generation dominate the energy mix, other sources of generation such
as natural gas serve largely as back-ups, and many developers are hesitant to
build back-up generation capacity that will be rarely used. 114 Without enough
back-up power, intermittent renewables, which decrease output when the sun
goes behind a cloud or the wind stops blowing, can cause reliability problems. 115
Grid operators and generators solve these challenges in a variety of ways. A
growing number of solar and wind plants have battery back-up (available only
for short periods), and large renewable energy generators must prove that they
have the ability to remotely shut down power during periods of over-supply. 116
And for regionally-governed grids that cover large geographic areas, it is likely
that the wind is blowing or the sun is shining somewhere in the region during
most parts of the day, thus allowing the grid operator to dispatch renewable
electricity from different locations at different times. 117 But large,
interconnected electricity systems—whether based primarily on renewable or

111
See, e.g., T.L. Hamilton, Texas Gas Well Freeze-Offs, Power Cuts Persist, ARGUS (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2187702-texas-gas-well-freezeoffs-power-cuts-persist.
112
Erin Douglas, Texas Relies Largely on Natural Gas for Power. It Wasn’t Ready for the Extreme Cold,
TX. TRIBUNE (Feb. 16, 2021, 5:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/16/natural-gas-power-storm/.
113
See, e.g., Bryan Mena, Abbott and Other Republicans Blamed Green Energy for Texas’s Power Woes.
But the State Runs on Fossil Fuels, TX. TRIBUNE (Feb. 17, 2021, 7:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/
02/17/abbott-republicans-green-energy/.
114
THOMAS JENKIN, PHILIP BEITER & ROBERT MARGOLIS, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. CAPACITY
PAYMENTS IN RESTRUCTURED MARKETS UNDER LOW AND HIGH PENETRATION LEVELS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY
(2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/65491.pdf (noting that variable renewable energy resources can
“suppress energy prices while providing relatively little capacity” and that this can “impact compensation and
associated incentives for new and existing conventional thermal generation”).
115
See L. BIRD, M. MILLIGAN & D. LEW, INTEGRATING VARIABLE RENEWABLE ENERGY: CHALLENGES
AND SOLUTIONS 1 (2013), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/60451.pdf (noting that “supply-side variability
and uncertainty can pose new challenges for utilities and system operators”).
116
Interconnection for Wind Energy, 70 Fed. Reg. 242 (Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n Dec. 12, 2005)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (Order 661).
117
BIRD ET AL., supra note 115, at 1.
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fossil fuel systems—remain vulnerable, as highlighted by the recent incident in
the U.S. South.
Relying more heavily on smaller, more distributed green energy could
address many of the challenges here, as explored in Part III. Small energy
requires fewer transmission and distribution lines, thus impacting fewer host
communities. It enhances reliability by providing for “islanded” microgrids or
rooftop systems that can continue operating even in the face of widespread
outages. 118 And more rapid, widespread construction of small-scale green
energy can directly distribute the benefits of green energy to the communities
that have historically experienced lopsided impacts from energy generation and
production. Despite these benefits, one might legitimately ask whether a
significant expansion of small energy is practical. The following Part explores
the factors that have made small-scale energy a more feasible option within a
broader green energy revolution.
II. FACTORS SUPPORTING A SMALL GREEN REVOLUTION
The prospect of supplying a large percentage of U.S. electricity from
rooftops, roadways, and parking lots—a scenario deemed possible by the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory—likely seems implausible to the casual
observer. 119 But a combination of distributed renewables paired with battery
storage; energy efficiency measures; and community solar and microgrids could
achieve this goal. 120 This is due to the convergence of technological and
economic factors that support these small energy forms.
A. Technology
A small-scale clean energy revolution is possible, in part, because the recent
technological advances in this area have been nothing short of astounding. Solar
panels, wind turbines, and home batteries have become far more efficient and
effective in the past several decades. 121
PV panels now come in a variety of forms, including shingles attached to the
roofs of homes and apartment buildings. 122 Between 2018 and 2019, the
residential solar industry experienced 15% growth, reaching “its highest
See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
Gagnon et al., supra note 19.
120
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
121
See infra notes 127–38 and accompanying text.
122
Solar Shingles: Make Your Roof Solar-Powered (5 Brands), SOLAR MAG. (Feb. 21, 2020), https://
solarmagazine.com/solar-roofs/solar-shingles/.
118
119
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installation volumes in history.” 123 Indeed, PV technologies are now so readily
available (and increasingly affordable) that California recently mandated that
most new residential buildings be constructed to include PV technologies. 124
Commercial rooftop solar, too, has burgeoned. For instance, Walmart had 335
renewable energy projects completed or under construction worldwide in
2013. 125
Beyond the solar panels themselves, in the past five years, batteries to back
up distributed renewables have become widely available and are rapidly
dropping in price. 126 Industry experts estimate that one-third of residential solar
systems will also have battery storage by 2025. 127 Given the recent growth of
battery storage, customers with adequate means can, if they wish, wholly
disconnect from the power grid, thus imposing no new constraints on local
distribution wires. Approximately 180,000 U.S. homeowners have already
installed batteries and solar panels and have fully disconnected from the grid.128
A full grid disconnect does, however, require some sacrifices of comfort.
When operating on their own without input from a PV panel—at night, for
example—home batteries cannot typically power all appliances in the home,
particularly power-hungry appliances such as air conditioning systems. 129
Homes and businesses with solar panels and batteries can also remain grid
connected but rely on their panels and batteries during a blackout, provided they
install the proper technologies to cut their system off from the grid during the

123
Press Release, Solar Energy Indus. Ass’n, Solar Accounts for 40% of U.S. Electric Generating Capacity
Additions in 2019, Adds 13.3 GW (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.seia.org/news/solar-accounts-40-us-electricgenerating-capacity-additions-2019-adds-133-gw.
124
24 Cal. Code Regs. 150.1(b)(1); Cal. Energy Commission, Building Energy Efficiency Standards for
Residential and Nonresidential Buildings § 10-115 (2019) (allowing community solar installations in lieu of
panels on each new rooftop).
125
David Ozment, Walmart’s Commitment to Solar, WALMART (May 9, 2014), https://corporate.walmart.
com/newsroom/sustainability/20140509/walmarts-commitment-to-solar.
126
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., BATTERY STORAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE ON MARKET
TRENDS 5, 18 (2020), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/electricity/batterystorage/pdf/battery_storage.pdf
(noting that U.S. battery storage capacity doubled between 2015 and 2018, with an average decrease in cost of
61% between 2015 and 2017).
127
SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, SOLAR MARKET INSIGHT REPORT 2020 Q3, https://www.seia.org/
research-resources/solar-market-insight-report-2020-q3#:~:text=By%202025%2C%20one%2Dfifth%20of,be
%20paired%20with%20energy%20storage.
128
Barry Cinnamon, The Myth of the Whole-Home Battery Backup, GREEN TECH MEDIA, https://www.
greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-myth-of-whole-home-battery-backup (Dec. 2, 2019).
129
Id. (noting that “battery backup inverters are not powerful enough to start and run many large
appliances”). Tesla notes, however, that two Powerwalls can run some air conditioners. What Does Powerwall
Back Up, TESLA, https://www.tesla.com/support/energy/powerwall/learn/what-does-powerwall-back-up (last
visited May 12, 2021).
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blackout. 130 Solar will not be the most efficient option in cloudy climates, but in
these areas, more energy efficiency measures can be implemented, and a
growing suite of small wind technologies also show promise, as do fuel cells
powered by green hydrogen. 131
Beyond rooftop and parking lot solar, options for community solar and wind
projects have recently blossomed. Community renewable energy involves midscale installations, often in public or quasi-public places such as airports, which
typically provide electricity to a group of nearby customers who have subscribed
to the project. 132 The technological advances in PV technologies noted above
apply equally to the residential and community scales. 133 And for the larger solar
photovoltaic panels sometimes installed for community projects, there are now
lightweight panels that can be installed primarily with hand labor rather than
heavy machines. These have been deployed at former landfills, airports, and
similar sites. 134
Similarly, community-scale microgrids are increasingly feasible, offering
local, green options and enhanced reliability during outages. Microgrids are
“small-scale, low-voltage distributed generation,” which typically power a
portion of a neighborhood using “sources such as solar collectors, wind power
systems, microturbines, geothermal wells, and fuel cells.” 135 In Connecticut,
where the state has provided support for microgrids, fuel cell-powered
microgrids (relying primarily on natural gas—a non-renewable resource) now
supply electricity to critical infrastructure within neighborhoods—particularly

130
See, e.g., Will Solar Panels Work During a Power Outage, SUNRUN, https://www.sunrun.com/go-solarcenter/solar-articles/will-solar-panels-work-during-a-power-outage#:~:text=The%20inverter%20runs%20to%
20a,so%20will%20your%20solar%20panels.&text=The%20only%20way%20for%20your,blackout%20is%20
solar%20battery%20storage (last visited May 12, 2021) (noting that “[t]he only way for your solar panels to
continue generating power during a blackout is solar battery storage”).
131
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, SMALL WIND GUIDEBOOK, https://windexchange.energy.gov/smallwind-guidebook (last visited May 12, 2021) (describing the range of small wind technologies available to
homeowners, businesses, and communities). Green hydrogen is hydrogen fuel produced from renewable energy.
Jim Robbins, Green Hydrogen: Could It Be Key to a Carbon-Free Economy?, YALE ENV’T 360 (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://e360.yale.edu/features/green-hydrogen-could-it-be-key-to-a-carbon-free-economy.
132
See, e.g., Community Solar Basics, OFF. ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, U.S. DEPT. OF
ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/community-solar-basics (last visited May 12, 2021) (defining
community solar as “any solar project or purchasing program, within a geographic area, in which the benefits of
a solar project flow to multiple customers such as individuals, businesses, nonprofits, and other groups”).
133
U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY SOLAR: UTILITY, PRIVATE, AND NON-PROFIT
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT (2010), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/49930.pdf.
134
See, e.g., PEG Substructure for Solar Power Plants, JURCHEN TECH., https://www.jurchen-technology.
com/products/pv-substructures/peg/ (last visited May 12, 2021).
135
Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547, 549–50 (2010).
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public buildings that can provide refuge and support during storms, including
gas stations, grocery stores, schools, senior centers, and health centers. 136
Finally, with respect to reducing energy demand in buildings through energy
efficiency, technologies have also advanced substantially. Smart meters and
smart appliances now allow motivated customers to control all aspects of their
energy use, provided customers have the means to access these technologies. 137
And recent advances have improved technologies such as window-installed air
conditioners, which were previously inefficient. 138 Furthermore, many energy
efficiency measures do not require sophisticated technologies. The simple
weatherization of homes through caulking of cracks, improved insulation, and
similar measures can generate meaningful energy savings. 139
B. Economics
Beyond technological advances, the economics of small energy have
changed dramatically in recent years. Perhaps the most compelling statistic is
the price of solar panels that can be installed over parking lots, along roadways,
and on roofs. Due in large part to Chinese subsidization of panel production, the
cost of panels and associated hardware dropped by 82% between 2010 and
2018. 140
Indeed, all costs of small-scale PV solar have dropped—not just the cost of
the panels and associated physical equipment, but also installation labor and soft

136
Elisa Wood, Connecticut’s Latest Microgrid and Fuel Cell Project Goes Live in Hartford, MICROGRID
KNOWLEDGE (Apr. 25, 2017), https://microgridknowledge.com/microgrid-and-fuel-cell-hartford/. Although
these microgrids are primarily powered using natural gas fuel cells, microgrids can also be powered with green
hydrogen fuel.
137
See, e.g., Smart Appliances, HOME DEPOT, https://www.homedepot.com/b/Smart-Home-SmartAppliances/N-5yc1vZc7c2 (last visited May 12, 2021).
138
U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, BETTER BUILDINGS (2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/07/
f35/bbrn_CallSummary_InnovationStation_051817.pdf (describing EcoSnap-AC).
139
See, e.g., OFF. ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, DEPT. OF ENERGY, GETTING IT RIGHT:
WEATHERIZATION AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY ARE GOOD INVESTMENTS (2015), https://www.energy.gov/eere/
articles/getting-it-right-weatherization-and-energy-efficiency-are-good-investments#:~:text=Savings%20
estimates%20from%20the%20E2e,higher%20end%20of%20that%20range.&text=This%20study%20reported
%20average%20annual,for%20weatherized%20single%2Dfamily%20homes (noting “10 to 20 percent energy
savings from weatherization”).
140
RAN FU, DAVID FELDMAN & ROBERT MARGOLIS, NATL. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. SOLAR
PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEM COST BENCHMARK: Q1 2018, at 21, https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy19osti/72399.pdf.
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costs such as overhead. 141 Labor costs experienced nearly as precipitous a
decline as hardware in the same time period—dropping by 77%. 142
Rooftop solar will not always be the most efficient option: many roofs are
not properly oriented for solar access or have physical obstacles to the
installation of panels, the roofs that support panels fail over time, and solar
panels placed on millions of roofs require maintenance and repair. 143
Community solar projects offer advantages in these areas; they are often sited at
airports and other non-rooftop locations within communities, and they are
typically maintained by an independent entity, not individual homeowners. 144
The prices for PV for mid-scale applications have similarly declined, thus
making commercial- and community-scale solar more feasible and
affordable. 145
Utility-scale systems are still far more efficient on a per-watt basis than
smaller-scale systems—particularly residential systems—due to economies of
scale in terms of acquiring the project (e.g., getting a customer to agree to a
rooftop lease as opposed to permission to use a large property), supply chain
issues, and labor. 146 But there are credible arguments that as the effects of
climate change intensify, it will be less expensive to rely on distributed
renewables than to increase the strength of thousands of miles of transmission
lines vulnerable to storm damage and move the large power plants threatened by
sea level rise. 147 That said, centralized generation and transmission remain far
cheaper than small-scale energy, and recent studies emphasize that the lowest
141
Solar Installed System Cost Analysis, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., https://www.nrel.gov/
analysis/solar-installed-system-cost.html (last visited May 12, 2021).
142
FU ET AL., supra note 140, at 21.
143
U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY SOLAR: UTILITY, PRIVATE, AND NON-PROFIT
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 2–3 (2010), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/49930.pdf.
144
See, e.g., Community Solar, NORWICH SOLAR TECHS., https://norwichsolar.com/solutions/communitysolar/ (last visited May 12, 2021) (noting that the community solar company “has created an LLC that is
responsible for the operations and maintenance” of its several projects).
145
Id.
146
MICHAEL WOODHOUSE ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, ON THE
PATH TO SUNSHOT: THE ROLE OF ADVANCEMENTS IN SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC EFFICIENCY, RELIABILITY, AND
COSTS 39 (2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/65872.pdf; Lazard’s Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis
12.0, LAZARD (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.lazard.com/perspective/levelized-cost-of-energy-and-levelized-costof-storage-2018/ (showing far higher costs of rooftop solar as compared to utility-scale solar and onshore wind).
147
See, e.g., ELIZABETH B. STEIN & FERIT UCAR, ENV’T DEF. FUND, DRIVING ENVIRONMENTAL
OUTCOMES THROUGH UTILITY REFORM: LESSONS FROM NEW YORK REV 15–17 (2018), https://www.edf.org/
sites/default/files/documents/driving-environmental-outcomes.pdf (describing a proposal by Con Edison after
Superstorm Sandy to recover $1 billion from ratepayers “for the restoration and hardening of system elements”
and successful arguments by those opposed to the plan that a system that better integrated distributed resources,
managed load (demand), and took other approaches to enhance the flexibility of the grid rather than “harden”
the traditional grid would be more effective).
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cost way to a zero-carbon grid is likely through large-scale energy and a largescale expansion of the transmission grid. 148
The following Part explores how a green energy revolution could place more
emphasis on small-scale renewable technologies and reduce the impacts of the
many large-scale installations that will still be required to dramatically lower
carbon emissions from the U.S. electricity sector.
III. A BETTER PATH FORWARD: GREEN ENERGY POLICY STRATEGIES AND
BENEFITS
Given recent advances in small-scale technologies, a localized green
revolution, in concert with numerous other pathways toward a lower carbon
future, including utility-scale renewables, is feasible. A green revolution at the
federal, state, and local levels that prioritized energy efficiency and smaller-scale
renewable generation could empower smaller groups with historic
disadvantages in the political process, overcome psychological barriers to
climate action, and avoid some of the massive transmission and large-scale
generation buildout likely to face strong opposition in rural communities. It
could also enhance resiliency and reliability, as discussed here. This Part
explores the types of policy changes needed to steer the green energy revolution
toward a dual small- and large-scale focus and the benefits of this policy
approach.
A. Formulating a “Small Energy First” Climate Policy: More Ambitious
Mandates for Small-Scale Generation and Energy Efficiency
To accomplish a smaller-scale green energy revolution, U.S. and state
policies, including state clean energy policies and renewable portfolio standards,
should mandate larger percentages of clean energy to come from small-scale
sources. President Biden’s plan calls for 100% carbon-free electricity by 2035;
a plan focused on small-scale energy would require some of this change—say,
30%—to be achieved through energy efficiency projects, distributed renewable
energy and storage projects, and community renewables and microgrids.
President Biden’s pledge to build 1.5 million new energy efficient homes is a
start, but it pales in comparison to the energy infrastructure that will have to be
built to support 100% clean energy. 149
148
Jeff St. John, MIT Study: Transmission Is Key to a Low-Cost, Decarbonized US Grid, GREEN TECH
MEDIA (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/study-transmission-is-the-key-to-a-lowcost-decarbonized-u.s-grid.
149
See President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Remarks by President Biden Before Signing Executive Actions on
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Many state renewable portfolio standards already have specific “carve-outs”
for distributed renewables, but they are quite small. 150 And although twenty-five
states have energy efficiency resource standards, many are also inadequately
ambitious. 151 Grants and other incentives for clean energy projects should
similarly prioritize small-scale infrastructure.
B. Reorienting Large-Scale Renewable Projects
Although small-scale green energy could cover a meaningful portion of
energy load, a federal policy focused predominantly on large-scale renewable
projects will still be critical for substantial carbon reductions to occur in the
electricity sector. 152 To address environmental impacts and environmental
justice concerns associated with the construction of these projects, policies
should build from New York’s example, where the state’s 2020 clean energy
policy gives expedited permitting to large renewable energy projects proposed
on “an existing or abandoned commercial use” lot. 153 The redevelopment of
these types of sites—if done properly and carefully—could benefit communities
negatively impacted by past projects due to pollution or longstanding site
vacancies, for example. 154
Many rural areas, however, have few abandoned commercial lots and tend
to be dominated by agricultural land. Federal and state green energy policies
should therefore expand mandates for the use of marginal lands, such as lowproductivity farmlands or abandoned resource extraction sites. 155 New Mexico’s

Tackling Climate Change. Creating Jobs, and Restoring Scientific Integrity (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/27/remarks-by-president-biden-before-signingexecutive-actions-on-tackling-climate-change-creating-jobs-and-restoring-scientific-integrity/.
150
NC Clean Energy Technology Center, Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) with Solar or Distributed
Generation Provisions, DSIRE (Mar. 2015), https://www.dsireusa.org/resources/detailed-summary-maps/rpscarveout-map-3/ (showing requirements that between 0.25 and 4.5% of renewable energy within states come
from distributed generation).
151
DSIRE, NC CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CENTER, ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARDS (AND
GOALS) (2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ncsolarcen-prod/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Energy-EfficiencyResource-Standards.pdf.
152
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
153
S. 7508-B § 94-c 5.f (N.Y. 2020). For a more in-depth exploration of New York’s renewable energy
siting law, see Michael Gerrard & Edward McTiernan, New York’s State Statute on Siting Renewable Energy
Facilities, N.Y.L.J. (May 14, 2020), https://www.arnoldporter.com/-/media/files/perspectives/publications/
2020/05/newyorksenvironmentallaw.pdf?.
154
For exploration of the benefits of siting utility-scale renewable generation on disturbed sites and other
states that encourage such siting, see, e.g., Gerrard, supra note 8, at 10602; Amy Morris, Jessica Owley & Emily
Capello, Green Siting for Green Energy, 5 J. ENERGY & ENV’T. L .17 (2014) .
155
But see supra note 19 for a description of the caution that must be exercised in defining marginalized
lands.
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Energy Transition Act partially takes this approach. 156 The Act prioritizes
renewable energy sites that have the “least environmental impacts” and reduce
the cost of reclaiming former coal mine sites in coal power plant communities,
presumably by beneficially reusing those sites. 157 Siting new renewable
generation near or on the sites of old power plants threatens to perpetuate past
environmental justice issues if not done properly—with extensive community
engagement. But if the generation can be built in a way that is compatible with
the community, it has the added benefit of requiring fewer new transmission
resources because it can interconnect with the transmission lines previously used
by the coal-fired plant. 158
Offshore wind also avoids many of the land-based impacts of large-scale
renewables. Communities along the shore sometimes vociferously object to the
aesthetics, and communities between the generation and load centers still
shoulder the burdens of transmission lines. 159 Furthermore, our oceans are not
empty spaces; pipelines, transmission lines, shipping routes, fisheries,
aquaculture, and a variety of other offshore uses already pose obstacles to
additional offshore development; these obstacles are surmountable through
planning, however. 160 An additional barrier arises from the high cost of offshore
wind as compared to its onshore counterpart. 161 But given the large percentage
of the U.S. population that lives along the coast; the relatively open seabed; and
the relatively constant, stronger wind offshore, many East Coast states are
pursuing offshore wind. 162
S.B. 489 § 3 (N.M. 2019).
Id.
158
See, e.g., Karen Uhlenhuth, Solar Firm Buying Land Rights Nera Coal Plants with Eye Toward
Transmission, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Jul. 14, 2020), https://energynews.us/2020/07/14/west/solar-firmbuying-land-rights-near-coal-plants-with-eye-toward-transmission (noting that a large solar company is leasing
land near coal plants in hopes of opening up “lucrative transmission connections”).
159
The Cape Wind project, proposed in federal waters near the Massachusetts coast, attracted stiff
opposition from wealthy residents near the coast. Although the developer of the proposed project won all of the
numerous lawsuits filed in opposition to the project, it abandoned the project after sixteen years of litigation.
Katharine Q. Seelye, After 16 Years, Hopes for Cape Cod Wind Farm Float Away, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/us/offshore-cape-wind-farm.html.
160
See, e.g., LEVITAN & ASSOCIATES, INC., N.J. BD. OF PUB. UTIL., OFFSHORE WIND TRANSMISSION
STUDY COMPARISON OF OPTIONS 59, https://www.nj.gov/bpu/pdf/publicnotice/Transmission%20Study%20
Report%2029Dec2020%202nd%20FINAL.pdf (describing some of the obstacles to offshore transmission and
methods for avoiding these obstacles).
161
See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2021 at 7 (2021), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf (showing
a total levelized cost of $115.04 per megawatt hours of new offshore wind as opposed to $31.45 per megawatt
hour for onshore wind).
162
See Iulia Gheorghiu, Biden Administration Sets Target for 30 GW of Offshore Wind by 2030, Plans
Offshore Leasing off NY, NJ Coasts, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 30, 2021), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/biden156
157
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C. Addressing Environmental Justice Concerns
The bulk of existing industrial projects—many of them power plants—are
sited in low-income communities of color, posing a major environmental justice
concern. 163 To address past wrongs and provide benefits to these and similar
communities, government-mandated or subsidized small-scale energy projects
can and should be implemented first in low-income homes and apartments in
both rural and urban areas. 164 Beyond prioritizing low-income housing,
policymakers should require a percentage of funds for green energy initiatives
to specifically reach low-income communities of color. 165 To date, rooftop solar
and many energy savings measures have largely been implemented in single
family homes, largely in more affluent communities where individuals can
afford the high upfront cost of purchasing solar panels or fancy gadgets to reduce
administration-sets-target-for-30-gw-offshore-wind-by-2030-plans/597523/ (describing East Coast states’ plans
for offshore wind). On the West Coast, waters are deeper closer to shore, thus posing difficulties for traditional
offshore wind. Floating wing turbines, if commercialized, could solve this problem.
163
Minority communities suffer a disproportionate number of LULUs and their associated impacts. There
are disputes about whether these LULUs were sited in these communities when they were already predominantly
populated by low-income, minority residents or whether these residents “moved to the nuisance” due to an ability
to find affordable housing only in neighborhoods with LULUs. Regardless of the timing, it remains undisputed
that these communities host the bulk of undesirable land development and that the pollution and other impacts
from this development substantially and negatively affect their health. For discussion of the “moving to the
nuisance” question, see Been, supra note 28, at 1388–92. For discussion of the low-income, minority
communities suffering the bulk of polluting land uses, see Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and
Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Representation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 335 (1995) (observing that “minorities
and poor people disproportionately live closer to polluting industries than do nonminorities” and listing and
analyzing sources). For discussion of the importance of rooftop solar for low-income communities, in particular,
see, e.g., Outka, supra note 72, at 810 (exploring how energy costs make up a disproportionate amount of lowincome residents’ expenditures and arguing for equitable access to rooftop solar, which has predominantly been
installed in wealthier communities to date); Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 580
(2017) (arguing for a “participatory grid” in which all consumers have access to policies and technologies that
help to lower electricity consumption).
164
For a summary of some of the existing programs that have supported small-scale energy in low-income
housing, see STEFEN SAMARRIPAS & DAN YORK, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., OUR POWERS
COMBINED: ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND SOLAR IN AFFORDABLE MULTIFAMILY BUILDINGS, at iv (2018),
https://www.aceee.org/research-report/u1804. For the importance of small-scale energy in rural communities,
see, e.g., BEN A. WENDER, NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENG’G, & MED. ELECTRICITY USE IN RURAL AND ISLANDED
COMMUNITIES: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP 5 (2016), http://www.nap.edu/23539 (noting that “rural communities
contain a greater proportion of low-to-moderate-income individuals with greater difficulty accessing credit or
capital necessary to invest in home improvements”).
165
These types of requirements—viewed as affirmative action programs by courts—can run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (invalidating a local
program favoring minority-owned businesses under strict scrutiny review). But with adequate evidence
regarding the necessity of the relief and the narrow tailoring of a program to achieve those needs, among other
measures, these programs can survive these challenges. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147,
1177–87 (10th Cir. 2000) (analyzing these factors and affirming the validity of a federal highway grant program
that favored “minority enterprises”).
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energy use. 166 And as wealthy individuals have reduced their consumption of
electricity—and therefore their payments through utility bills—the remaining
customers who lack these technologies shoulder more of the burden of paying
for distribution wires and other aspects of the shared electricity system. 167
The federal government and some states have already taken steps toward
subsidizing clean energy for low-income communities. 168 President Biden has
pledged that 40% of the $2 trillion that he plans to invest in clean energy will go
to disadvantaged communities, although this is yet to be solidified within
policy. 169 New York similarly requires 40% of clean energy investments to go
to disadvantaged communities, with much of the investment focused on energy
efficiency, including “clean heating and cooling.” 170 California, too, offers
several programs for low-income residents, including upfront rebates for rooftop
solar, and discounts for customers who lack the ability to install rooftop panels
(those in multi-family housing, for example) but who wish to purchase green
energy or invest in a community solar project. 171 Colorado, New York, and
Oregon also mandate support for low-income residents’ participation in
community solar projects. 172
U.S. energy policy could go much further in terms of specifically
empowering underrepresented groups and targeting the types of clean energy
development that are most likely to benefit these communities. With particularly
careful design, grants and mandates could even encourage the formation of
“boundary organizations”—a political science term that describes the creation
of stakeholder groups that cross the lines that typically divide sectors. 173 For
166
Welton, supra note 163 at 574; Shelley Welton & Joel Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an
Emerging Agenda, 43 HARV. ENV’T. L. REV. 307, 326 (2019).
167
Welton, supra note 163, at 574; Welton & Eisen, supra note 166, at 326–27; see also Troy A. Rule,
Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 136 (2014) (noting this
regressivity concern and that solar leasing has helped to “expand the accessibility of distributed solar energy to
some customers with lesser means,” but that even leasing requires customers to have “solid credit histories and
stable incomes”).
168
See supra note 164; infra notes 169–70.
169
The Biden Plan to Secure Environmental Justice and Equitable Economic Opportunity,
JOEBIDEN.COM, https://joebiden.com/environmental-justice-plan/.
170
Governor Cuomo Announces Clean Energy Investments to Benefit Over 350,000 Low-to-Moderate
Income Households, NEW YORK STATE (Jul. 27, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomoannounces-clean-energy-investments-benefit-over-350000-low-moderate-income.
171
Low-Income Solar Policy Guide: California, https://www.lowincomesolar.org/best-practices/singlefamily-california/ (updated Feb. 2018); Green Tariffs/Shared Renewables Program (GTSR), CAL. PUB. UTIL.
COMM’N, https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/GTSR/ (last visited May 21, 2021).
172
Low- and Moderate-Income Solar Policy Basics, NATL. RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., https://www.nrel.
gov/state-local-tribal/lmi-solar.html.
173
See Stephanie Lenhart, Natalie Nelson-Marsh, Elizabeth J. Wilson & David Solan, Electricity
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example, some government grants could be reserved for programs that pair
community college and technical school clean energy training programs with
equipment suppliers and community groups representing the consumers who
could benefit from these installations.
Another method that could shake up traditional interest group dynamics and
empower underrepresented groups is to channel more subsidies for energy
efficiency and small-scale renewables directly to end-users. Governments
already do this through instruments such as tax credits for customers’ clean
energy installations. 174 But tax credits are a luxury that often benefit only the
wealthier segments of society. They do not cover the full cost of installation, and
they are an ex-post payment. Direct grants to consumers, with clear limits on the
expenditure of funds, could empower broader segments of communities. 175
This approach would, of course, also attract larger groups who benefit from
end-user grants, rebates, or credits, such as associations of contractors. Indeed,
although rooftop solar is small in scale, several large companies are key players
in this field, as with centralized renewables. Sunrun, now owned by Tesla, has
the largest market share—just over 9%—in the rooftop solar industry. 176 But the
very prospect of large amounts of funds being funneled to a smaller scale—
appliances within homes and solar panels on rooftops, parking lots, and along
roadways, might tend to attract a more diverse array of interests, in terms of size
and power, to the decision-making table.
Programs that prioritize small-scale, low-carbon energy measures in lowincome communities must carefully address the needs and desires of these
communities before plowing forward with implementation. Communityengaged programs are essential. Many communities will be rightfully skeptical
of programs that tell them how and why they should change their living spaces
Governance and the Western Energy Imbalance Market in the United States: The Necessity of
Interorganizational Collaboration, 19 ENERGY RSCH. & SOC. SCI. 94, 95 (2016) (describing boundary
organizations).
174
Dan Quinley, More Power to the Wealthy: Renewable Energy Tax Programs, Market Distortions, and
the Ramifications on the Cost of Electricity, ENVIRONS: ENV’T L. & POL’Y J. 185, 189–90 (2017) (describing the
Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit).
175
Cf. Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Equity, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 335, 347 (2019) (observing, in the
context of large-scale energy development, that when the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act temporarily
transformed a tax credit for wind energy into a “direct cash subsidy,” “the pool of direct economic beneficiaries
increased dramatically beyond” beyond the few “highly profitable” corporations and handful of banks that
previously benefited).
176
Bryan White, Sunrun Holds Its Ground at the Top of US Residential Solar Rankings, GREENTECH
MEDIA (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/sunrun-holds-its-ground-at-1-in-us-residentialsolar-rankings.
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to support a green revolution. 177 There is a growing consensus in the literature
that perceptions of large-scale renewable energy projects largely flow from
perceptions of the fairness of the project development process. 178 There are
many ways to improve this process. Educational campaigns can give residents
the data that they need to raise strong arguments for the mitigation of impacts
from clean energy land uses. 179 Developers or governments can also appoint an
ombudsman—an individual whose sole job is to answer citizens’ questions
about a governmental process and to help those citizens engage with the
process. 180 Environmental review statutes, which approximately fifteen states
have, require agencies approving new developments to first seriously consider
the environmental and social impacts of these developments and explain why
they selected a particular location and scale of development. 181 If implemented
properly, these statutes can help ensure that communities have adequate input in
the siting process. Additional tools include encouraging or requiring renewable
energy developers to enter into community benefits agreements with host
communities, as New York does. 182 These agreements can include monetary
donations and in lieu contributions such as the construction of parks and schools
by developers, and they can also list detailed mitigation measures that will
reduce the impacts of development. 183 They must be carefully designed,
however, to constitute a real investment in a community rather than a buy-out.

177
Cf. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, SUMMARY OF GAPS AND
BARRIERS FOR IMPLEMENTING RESIDENTIAL BUILDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY STRATEGIES 10 (2010),
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/49162.pdf (noting that “[s]aving energy may be low on the list of priorities
when a homeowner decides to make changes to his/her home (usually comes after financial, comfort and other
values”).
178
See, e.g., Hoen, supra note 49; Anahita A.N. Jami & Philip R. Walsh, The Role of Public Participation
in Identifying Stakeholder Synergies in Wind Power Project Development: The Case Study of Ontario, Canada,
68 RENEWABLE ENERGY 194, 194 (2014); Stewart Fast et al., Lessons Learned from Ontario Wind Energy
Disputes, 1 NAT. ENERGY 1 (2016); Theresea M. Groth & Christine Vogt, Residents’ Perceptions of Wind
Turbines: An Analysis of Two Townships in Michigan, 65 ENERGY POL’Y. 251 (2014).
179
See, e.g., Sean Nolon, Negotiating the Wind: A Framework to Engage Citizens in Siting Wind Turbines,
12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 327, 345 (2011).
180
Hannah Wiseman, Note, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings Initiatives, 116
YALE L.J. 1518, 1560 (2007).
181
See Tara K. Righetti, The Incidental Environmental Agency, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 685, 709 (2020)
(describing state NEPAs).
182
S. 7508-B, § 94-c 5.f (N.Y. 2020) (mandating that “[t]he final siting permit [for a renewable energy
installation] shall include a provision requiring the permittee to provide a host community benefit”); Wiseman,
supra note 84, at 605–06 (advocating for a requirement for developer negotiation of benefits agreements with
communities).
183
See, e.g., Kristen Van de Biezenbos, Contracted Fracking, 92 TUL. L. REV. 587, 614–16 (2018)
(describing CBAs); see also Wiseman, supra note 84 at 606.
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Beyond considering the incorporation of these types of process-enhancing
measures, green energy policies should build from programs such as the New
York State Healthy Homes Value-Based Payment Pilot, which pairs in-home
energy efficiency and weatherization work with home visits from nurses and
community health workers to reduce asthma and other respiratory risks. 184
Similar programs that engage families in health efforts and connect these efforts
to energy efficiency programs have also met with success in cities such as
Seattle. 185 Weatherization of homes controls moisture infiltration and pests,
which, in turn, cuts down on asthma triggers such as mold and in-home
pesticides. 186 Furthermore, installing efficient air conditioning units and heat
pumps in the many apartments and homes that currently lack any cooling or
adequate heating can protect residents from temperature extremes and improve
air filtration. 187
Focusing the green energy revolution on low-income and BIPOC
communities first—and doing so through an engaged process—could have a
variety of benefits, including reducing energy burdens for those who face the
highest burdens, empowering groups who typically have a weaker voice in
energy decision-making processes, and improving health outcomes within these
communities, as shown by the Seattle and New York programs.
D. Mitigating Impacts on Rural Communities and the Environment
Beyond their ability to empower and benefit groups who tend to be underrepresented in the political process, energy efficiency and small-scale energy
measures can benefit rural communities—many of which are predominantly
low-income—and avoid some of the large renewable generation and
transmission infrastructure slated to be built in these communities. 188 A
reduction in the need for large-scale energy infrastructure can also have major
environmental benefits, among other types of benefits.
184
Author Conversation with Mishel Filisha, New York State Energy Rsch. and Dev. Auth. (Feb. 5, 2020)
(notes on file with author).
185
Jill Breysee et al., supra note 25, at 63 (concluding that the program “substantially improved asthma”
and improved homes).
186
Id.
187
See, e.g., Nate Seltenrich, Between Extremes: Health Effects of Heat and Cold, 123 ENV’T HEALTH
PERSP. A275, A279 (2015).
188
Ale Bishaw & Kirby G. Posey, Incomes and Poverty Higher in Urban Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2017/11/income-poverty-rural-america.html (noting
that “[h]ouseholds in rural areas have lower incomes than those in urban areas but they are less likely to live in
poverty than their urban counterparts”). But see Iryna Kyzyma, Rural-Urban Disparity in Poverty Persistence,
34 INST. FOR RSCH. ON POVERTY FOCUS 13, 13 (2018) (concluding that “[e]xtensive evidence shows that poverty
is more prevalent in rural compared to urban areas”).

WISEMANFINAL_6.3.21

2021]

LOCALIZING THE GREEN ENERGY REVOLUTION

6/3/2021 10:03 AM

97

1. Enhancing Distinct Rural Benefits and Political Consensus
Small-scale renewable energy measures populate an unusual policy area that
attracts voters from extreme ends of the political spectrum. Distributed solar, in
particular, enjoys support from rural, libertarian voters who want energy
independence and a more reliable electricity supply and from liberal, urban
voters who are concerned about climate change. 189 The subsidies and mandates
that drive the revolution—if rolled out as aggressively as many policymakers
intend—will benefit all of these voters.
Rural residents will also benefit from small-scale energy in important,
distinctive ways that could potentially enhance their support for green energy
policies. Many rural residents are low-income residents who face high energy
burdens, in part because it requires more energy to heat or cool substandard
residential spaces. Take the example of the area served by the Roanoke Electric
Cooperative, where there are “more than twice the number of mobile homes
compared to national benchmarks” and “[m]ore than 30 percent of the
community members report having an average electricity bill in excess of $250
per month.” 190 An energy efficiency program implemented by the electricity
cooperative in this area resulted in average bills declining to $60 monthly, “with
the balance kept as savings by the customer.” 191
Beyond the income status of residents, the distribution of electricity to rural
homes is disproportionately expensive simply because these homes tend to be
located farther from generation centers. Furthermore, rural homes are sometimes
the last to regain power after an outage, as utilities tend to focus on more
populated areas first. As explored further below, small-scale green energy in the
form of distributed solar and microgrids can enhance the reliability of power,
thus allowing some rural consumers (and others) to avoid outages to begin with
or to maintain at least some amount of power despite a widespread outage. And
small-scale projects will alleviate the need for some of the massive generation
projects and transmission lines that would be predominantly sited in rural
communities. 192
189
See, e.g., Payne et al., supra note 18, at 17 (describing how rural and urban customers in the otherwisedivided Pedernales Electric Cooperative in Texas, which includes electricity users in the Austin metro area and
highly rural areas, support rooftop solar).
190
Wender, supra note 164, at 6.
191
Id. at 7.
192
See, e.g., ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Assessing the Electricity System Benefits of Energy Efficiency and
Renewable Energy, in QUANTIFYING THE MULTIPLE BENEFITS OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE
ENERGY: A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 3–5 (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2018-07/documents/mbg_2-3_electricitysystembenefits.pdf (describing the generation and transmission
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2. Addressing Psychological Barriers to Climate Initiatives
As explored in Part I, all humans, whether progressive or conservative, rural
or urban, struggle with climate policies for a variety of psychological reasons—
in large part because the costs of addressing climate change now are concrete
and clear, whereas the benefits are disbursed globally and accrue in the future.
In rural areas, the conservative tendency to oppose Democrat-led climate
initiatives compounds the existing psychological barriers to these initiatives. 193
Smaller-scale energy projects can, however, produce visible, concrete, and
current benefits for energy consumers, thus potentially combatting this
psychological barrier. The hefty reduction in energy bills wrought by energy
efficiency and net metered solar—solar energy sold back to utilities when homes
or businesses produce more electricity than they consume—could enhance
support for low-carbon energy initiatives.
E. Enhancing Grid Reliability and Resilience
Another major benefit of smaller green energy is its ability to enhance grid
reliability—the constant supply of electricity in the quantities in which it is
demanded—and resiliency, which is the ability of electric generation and the
grid to bounce back quickly after an emergency such as a computer hack or a
storm. Small-scale energy in the form of microgrids—self-contained energy
systems on university campuses, for example—and distributed solar can be
“islanded,” meaning they can be temporarily disconnected from the broader
grid. 194 Indeed, after massive electricity outages in New York City as a result of
Superstorm Sandy, several microgrids never lost power. 195 Relying on smallscale generation rather than “hardening” extensive transmission networks to
weather increasingly severe storms can be cost-effective and can produce better
results with respect to reliability and resilience.

and distribution costs avoided by energy efficiency and renewables).
193
McCright AM, Marquart-Pyatt ST, Shwom RL, Brechin SR & Allen S., Ideology, Capitalism, and
Climate: Explaining Public Views About Climate Change in the United States, 21 ENERGY RES. SOC. SCI. 180,
184–86 (2016).
194
William C. Edwards, Scott Manson & Jakov Vico, Microgrid Islanding and Grid Restoration with Offthe-Shelf Utility Protection Equipment, 2017 IEEE CANADA INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN TECHNOLOGY
CONFERENCE, https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8058185.
195
Urban Green Council, Round Table Recap—Sandy Success Stories Revealed, URBAN GREEN COUNCIL
(Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.urbangreencouncil.org/content/news/roundtable-recap-sandy-successes-revealed;
Jiancheng Yu, Chris Marnay, Ming Jin, Cheng Yao, Xu Liu & Wei Feng, Review of Microgrid Development in
the United States and China and Lessons Learned from China, 145 ENERGY PROCEDIA 217, 218 (2018)
(describing the resilience attributes of microgrids).
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If small-scale energy development is first prioritized in low-income
neighborhoods, this will also improve the overall resilience of these
neighborhoods to climate emergencies such as increasingly severe storms.
Residents in these communities are at a disadvantage during these types of
emergencies because they often lack adequate transportation and other resources
that would allow them to escape or otherwise combat the effects of the storm. 196
In contrast with wealthier residents who can drive to a distant hotel or friend’s
house until the lights come back on, lower-income residents often must stay in
place, experiencing uncomfortable and sometimes life-threatening conditions
while waiting out the storm and resulting power outage.
IV. OVERCOMING LEGAL BARRIERS TO SMALL ENERGY
Distributed green energy in the form of rooftop and parking lot solar panels,
community solar, and energy efficiency measures face legal hurdles that,
although real, can be overcome. The literature has thoroughly explored these
barriers, but they merit brief reexamination due to rapidly changing laws in this
area. The legal hurdles arise in several policy spheres. In the land use area,
rooftop solar installers often face vague or anti-solar zoning laws or servitudes,
physical impediments on buildings within older neighborhoods, and shading
issues. 197 The ways in which land is owned or leased also pose both barriers and
opportunities to local energy. For example, under current legal structures,
tenants often have very different incentives from landlords and typically cannot
individually reap the benefits of green energy measures. 198
A. Land Use: Zoning, Covenants, and Easements
A primary obstacle to distributed and community renewable energy projects
arises in the form of municipal and county zoning laws, which sometimes ban
these types of energy, but more often fail to address them at all. 199 The omission
of renewable energy from many zoning laws creates uncertainties for
196
Alice Kaswan, Domestic Climate Change Adaptation and Equity, 42 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
11125, 11126 (2012).
197
Wiseman & Bronin, supra note 18.
198
MICHAEL CARLINER, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., REDUCING ENERGY COSTS IN
RENTAL HOUSING: THE NEED AND THE POTENTIAL 8 (2013), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.
edu/files/carliner_research_brief_0.pdf.
199
See Hannah J. Wiseman, Lyndsay Grisamer & E. Nichole Saunders, Formulating a Law of Sustainable
Energy: The Renewables Component, 28 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 827, 872 (2011) (similarly describing ordinances
that omit mention of renewables). Many states have prohibited local governments from banning rooftop solar.
See Evan J. Rosenthal, Letting the Sunshine In, 40 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 995, 998 (2013) (surveying state solar
access laws).
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developers, who must persuade local legislative bodies to amend the zoning code
to accommodate their projects. A growing number of zoning laws, however,
address rooftop solar, often allowing it as an “accessory use” to a home. 200
Mid-level community solar projects—placed in parks or other common
areas, for example—often remain unaddressed by zoning codes, thus requiring
somewhat onerous efforts by developers to work with local governments. Some
zoning codes limit the percentage of on-site energy consumption that renewable
energy may cover—thus largely constraining projects to a rooftop size. 201 But
some municipalities and counties have amended or proposed to amend these
limits and have specifically allowed community renewables in certain zones,
such as agricultural zones. 202
As with local zoning, covenants, conditions, and restrictions in communities
governed by homeowners’ or condominium owners’ associations can pose
obstacles to small-scale renewables. While many states also prohibit outright
bans on renewables within these communities, they do allow for reasonable
restrictions, such as covenants that ban front-yard renewable installations. 203
This can slow down renewable products or make them somewhat less
productive, although restrictions that substantially reduce the productivity of
solar or wind installations are often defined as unreasonable under state laws. 204
Another common issue for distributed solar, in particular, is the presence of
buildings and trees on neighboring properties that shade solar panels and make
them less productive. Many states recognize solar easements, in which
landowners can mutually agree to avoid shading. Others prevent the shading to
begin with. For example, California prohibits trees or other structures from
shading solar panels that existed prior to the growth of trees or the building of
new structures. 205 Still other states allow solar panel owners to force neighbors
to agree to a solar easement that will avoid shading if a local public board
Wiseman & Bronin, supra note 18.
See, e.g., MONTGOMERY CNTY., MD., MONTGOMERY CNTY. ZONING ORDINANCE, ch. 59, § 3.7.2
(2021), https://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/COUNCIL/Resources/Files/zta/2021/20210223_19-14.pdf (noting
that Montgomery County, Maryland, limits the amount of solar capacity to 120% of the energy that is produced
onsite, meaning that a large number of panels cannot be installed to sell electricity back to the grid).
202
See id.; Increase Community Solar Access in Montgomery County, SOLAR UNITED NEIGHBORS,
https://www.solarunitedneighbors.org/maryland/take-action/ensure-community-solar-supports-the-community/
(last visited May 12, 2021) (noting a proposed amendment to allow community solar projects in agricultural
zones).
203
Rosenthal, supra note 199 at 1006; Tesoro del Valle Master Homeowners Ass’n v. Griffin, 200 Cal.
App. 4th 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
204
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 714 (2015).
205
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25980.
200
201
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approves the easement and if the solar owner pays a government-established
amount of money to the homeowner burdened by the easement. 206
B. Ownership Forms
Different forms of individual ownership and community governance also
affect the feasibility of small energy projects. Subdivisions governed by
homeowners’ associations may be particularly good candidates for community
solar projects because the homeowners’ association can enter into a contract to
build a small solar farm on the community golf course, for example, or place
rooftop panels over the clubhouse and pool. 207 Additionally, for newly
constructed communities, laying out neighborhoods and homes in a manner that
is conducive to rooftop solar and community renewables is far easier than in
older neighborhoods. This is why some states and local governments now have
“solar ready subdivision” requirements, which specify lot orientations and the
location of vents and chimneys on roofs to support future solar development. 208
The renter-owner divide is another exceedingly important barrier to energy
policy measures. Most energy efficiency programs have focused on homes, yet
multi-family structures, which tend to house more low-income people and often
involve sub-standard living conditions, would benefit the most from energy
efficiency measures. 209 Furthermore, renters typically cannot install rooftop
solar panels because their landlords own the roofs. Nor can tenants reap the
monetary benefits of rooftop solar, such as net metering (selling excess
electricity back to the utility). Similarly, renters in apartments without submetered energy bills cannot benefit from energy efficiency measures. Very few
states allow landlords to submeter electricity, in which landlords would act like
a utility and individually charge and credit tenants for their electricity use. 210 A
well-managed submetering program could fix this problem, as could
government distributed solar and energy efficiency programs that primarily
targeted landlords of multi-family buildings.
A final limitation on small-scale energy arises in the form of state laws that
prohibit third-party ownership of rooftop solar. Third-party solar is one of the
most affordable options for many homeowners, as a company pays for the upfront cost of solar installation and then sells the electricity from the solar panels
206
207
208
209
210

See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.3 (2020).
Wiseman & Bronin, supra note 18, at 180.
Id. at 188–89.
CARLINER, supra note 198, at 8.
Wiseman & Bronin, supra note 18, at 190–91.
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to the resident at a fixed, long-term price. 211 But only a handful of states directly
prohibit this practice, and the prospect of widespread small-scale development
(and an associated inflow of cash) could perhaps persuade state legislatures to
amend this statutory barrier in those states. 212
CONCLUSION
As wildfires consume the western United States, coastal areas experience
more flooding, and entire communities begin to relocate due to climate change,
the urgency of moving to 100% zero-carbon energy is clear. 213 The current
federal administration and many states are committed to achieving this goal, and
in rapid fashion. As plans to roll out massive amounts of clean energy quickly
unfold, now is the time to get this energy revolution right. We can and must
avoid enhancing volatile political divisions, deep-seated environmental justice
issues, and negative infrastructural path dependence by prioritizing small-scale
energy alongside the utility-scale energy that will be necessary for a zero-carbon
future.
In some political circles, the green energy revolution is viewed as a winwin—less pollution, more jobs, and economic growth for communities. In other
circles, it represents a disastrous move, transforming hundreds of agricultural
communities, building thousands of miles of aesthetically displeasing and
environmentally damaging transmission lines, and raising electricity bills. A an
energy revolution focused on both small and large projects could chart a delicate
course between these two views. Energy efficiency measures result in wellestablished cost savings and have relatively quick payback periods, and they
help residents in ways unrelated to climate benefits, including improving health
and the comfort of homes. Some libertarians and religious groups, and many
liberals, also tend to support small-scale solar for varied yet equally valid
reasons, such as the independence that it provides and its environmental benefits.
And community solar projects allow residents, including renters, to participate
collectively in energy development.

211
Understanding Third-Party Ownership Financing Structures for Renewable Energy, ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/repowertoolbox/understanding-third-party-ownership-financingstructures-renewable-energy.
212
DSIRE, NC CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CENTER, 3RD PARTY SOLAR PV POWER PURCHASE
AGREEMENT (PPA) (2015), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/3rd-PartyPPA_0302015.pdf (showing five states as disallowing this financing arrangement).
213
See, e.g., Relocating Kivalina, U.S. CLIMATE RESILIENCE TOOLKIT, https://toolkit.climate.gov/casestudies/relocating-kivalina (last visited May 12, 2021).
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With a meaningful focus on small-scale zero-carbon resources in addition to
large-scale generation, it is possible to rapidly transform U.S. energy
infrastructure with fewer negative effects. Taking advantage of recent
technological, economic, and policy changes, we can harness the benefits of
small energy and avoid repeating the mistakes of past industrial transitions. And
given the gravity of these mistakes, the imperative to “get it right” is a strong
one.

